Migration in Burundi:
History, Current Trends and Future Prospects

Paper Series: Migration and Development Country Profiles

Sonja Fransen
sonja.fransen@Maastrichtuniversity.nl

Antony Otieno Ong’ayo
antony.ongayo@maastrichtuniversity.nl

February 2010
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance
Content

Abbreviations........................................................................................................... 5
Acronyms.................................................................................................................... 6
List of Tables.............................................................................................................. 7
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ 7

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 8

2. General Country Profile ..................................................................................11
   2.1 Population ............................................................................................................ 11
   2.2 Culture and ethnicity.......................................................................................... 12
   2.3 Colonial history .................................................................................................. 13
   2.4 Economic situation ............................................................................................. 13
   2.5 Political situation ............................................................................................... 15
   2.6 History of conflict in Burundi .......................................................................... 16
   2.7 Health in Burundi ............................................................................................... 18

3. Historical Overview of Migration in Burundi .............................................. 20
   3.1 Migration Patterns in the Great Lakes Region: 1960-2000 ............................... 20
   3.2 International migration from Burundi: 1960-2000 ...............................................21
      3.2.1 Refugee flows from Burundi ....................................................................... 21
      3.2.2 Main destinations ......................................................................................... 22
   3.3 Internal migration within Burundi: 1960-2000 ..................................................... 23
      3.3.1 Internal displacement .................................................................................. 23
      3.3.2 Relocation policies ...................................................................................... 23

4. Current Migration Patterns ............................................................................. 25
   4.1 Current regional migration in the Great Lakes Region ......................................... 25
   4.2 Current international Burundian migration ......................................................... 26
      4.2.1 Burundi as a refugee-sending country ......................................................... 26
      4.2.2 Burundi as a refugee-hosting country ......................................................... 27
   4.3 Current Internal Burundian migration ................................................................. 28
      4.3.1 Internally Displaced Persons in Burundi ....................................................... 28
      4.3.2 Rural-urban migration .................................................................................. 29

5. Burundian Diaspora in the Netherlands ......................................................... 31
   5.1 Tracing the origins ............................................................................................... 31
   5.2 Burundians in the Netherlands- size and status .................................................. 34
   5.3 Burundi migrants and organisations -Location and organizing ......................... 36
   5.4 Divisions within the diaspora in the Netherlands ............................................... 38
      5.4.1 Diversity in the Burundian community ......................................................... 38
      5.4.2 Minority fighting majority in the diaspora .................................................... 39

6. Migration and Development in Burundi ......................................................... 41
   6.1 Brain drain/ skill flow......................................................................................... 42
   6.2 Return migration ................................................................................................. 43
   6.3 Remittances ......................................................................................................... 45
      6.3.1 Remittances from Burundians in the Netherlands ....................................... 46
   6.4 The impact of remittances in Burundi ................................................................. 47
   6.5 International programmes for migration and development ............................. 48

7. Policies Regarding Migration ............................................................................. 51
   7.1 Migration policies in Burundi ............................................................................. 51
   7.2 Burundi Government’s policies towards the diaspora ....................................... 51
7.3 The EU migration policies - implications for Burundi ..................................................... 52

8. Migration Relationship with the Netherlands ................................................... 54
8.1 General Burundian relationship with the Netherlands .............................................. 54
8.2 Dutch policy towards Burundi ................................................................................. 55
8.3 An overview of Immigration and Refugee Legislation .............................................. 56
8.4 The Dutch migration policies and legislation- implications for Burundian migrants ............................................................................................................. 57

9. Future Perspectives on Burundian Migration ............................................. 59

10. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 61
    Diaspora ..................................................................................................................... 61
    Migration Policies ..................................................................................................... 61
    Return migration ...................................................................................................... 62
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABASA</td>
<td>Burundi African Alliance for the Salvation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWEPA</td>
<td>Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCB</td>
<td>Banque de Crédit de Bujumbura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Burundi in Action (BIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUB</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWPD</td>
<td>Burundi Women for Peace and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORDAID -</td>
<td>Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMR</td>
<td>Forced Migration Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>National Forces of Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLINA/FAP</td>
<td>Front for the National Liberation of Burundi/ Popular Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICDM</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Committee on Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Inter-church Organisation for Development Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displace Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>Immigration and Naturalization Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAES</td>
<td>Joint African EU Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dutch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDO</td>
<td>National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMI</td>
<td>Netherlands Migration Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OXFAM - Novib - Dutch Organisation for International Aid
PARENA Party for National Redress
PCD Policy Coherence for Development
PRP People’s Reconciliation Party
SCAIDE- Central Africa Integrated Development and Education
UN United Nations
UNAIDS United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UPRONA National Unity and Progress Party
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
WRR - Scientific Council for Government Policy

**Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hutu</td>
<td>Name of local ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsi</td>
<td>Name of local ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twa</td>
<td>Name of local ethnic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swahili</td>
<td>Local language in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirundi</td>
<td>Local language in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruanda-Urundi</td>
<td>Name used during the colonial period, referring to the territory comprised of current Burundi and Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikibiri</td>
<td>‘a duty carried out together for a needy person’ (in Kirundi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muyinga</td>
<td>Name of a village in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabarana</td>
<td>Helping together (in Kirundi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rijkswet op het Nederlandschap -</td>
<td>Netherlands Nationality Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verenigingen -</td>
<td>Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting -</td>
<td>Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wet inburgering nieuwkomers, (WIN) -</td>
<td>Newcomers Integration Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wet inburgering in het buitenland -</td>
<td>Integration Abroad Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het</td>
<td>Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regeringsbeleid -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 1: Ethnic Distribution of Political Posts (percent): 1929-2001 ........................................12
Table 2: Economic Indicators During the Period of Conflict..................................................14
Table 3: Political Situation in Burundi: 1962 - current .........................................................15
Table 4: Key Characteristics of Civil War in Burundi..............................................................17
Table 5: Net Migration rates Burundi: 1950-2000.................................................................22
Table 6: Refugees and IDPs in the Great Lakes Region: 2009 ..............................................25
Table 7: Migration In and From Burundi: 2009 .....................................................................26
Table 8: Burundian Refugees in Country of Asylum: October 2009 ......................................27
Table 9: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Burundi: October 2009 .........................................28
Table 10: Burundi Asylum Requests in the Netherlands by Sex and Age..............................35
Table 11: Residence Permits Granted to Burundian Asylum Seekers..................................37
Table 12: Net Migration rates Burundi: 2000-2050...............................................................61

List of Figures

Figure 1: Burundian Population in the Netherlands by Sex, Age and Marital Status... ....36

List of Maps

Map 2: Number of Returnees per Province as of 31 October 2008.................................34
1. Introduction

Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world and has witnessed substantial migration flows over the course of its history. Most of these migrants were refugees, escaping the violent ethnic conflict that has characterized the country mainly since the 1960s. Refugees fled to other parts of Burundi as well as to its neighbouring countries Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This led to a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) sites in Burundi and the establishment of refugee settlements, mainly in Tanzania. Living conditions in these sites and settlements have been reported to be poor. Since 2005 Burundi has a democratically-elected government, and the migration situation in Burundi has, apart from relatively minor incidents, been stable.

Burundi’s history of violent conflict and its resulting refugee flows have had a large impact on Burundi’s development processes. The duration and intensity of the conflicts have led to the destruction of Burundi’s economic infrastructure, and poverty levels have risen while economic growth has stagnated and decreased substantially. Burundi has yet to recover from this economic shock. In addition, due to the ethnic character of the most recent conflict, social ties within society have been severely disrupted. Current reconstruction efforts in Burundi therefore entail both economic and social processes.

An additional aspect of Burundi’s reconstruction processes is the return of refugees and IDPs, which now pose an additional challenge to the country. These repatriation movements put pressure on Burundi’s resources, since all returnees are to be fully reintegrated within society again. Many households have lost their homes and assets, such as land, and must be provided with the means to fulfil their basic needs by the Burundian government. This is an important challenge for a war-torn and densely-populated country such as Burundi.

The Burundian Diaspora, which emerged as a result of mass exodus during the past two major conflict periods (1972 and 1993), is increasingly receiving attention in terms of their possible role in the ongoing processes in the country, both from a political perspective and also in the current global debate on migration and development (Skeldon, 2007; Black et al 2007; IOM, 2005; Adepoju, 2008). The large number of Burundians in the diaspora, both locally and internationally are seen as possible major actors in the home country. The extent to which the Burundian diaspora’s potential could be tapped still remains a subject for further research, however. This is due to the fact that the
country is just beginning to recover from decades of civil war and still faces challenges with regard to national reconciliation, in which the diaspora are critical players either as supporters of the antagonists or victims. In this context members of the Burundian diaspora have been involved developments in Burundi even if from a distance, both from the neighbouring countries in the region as well as from host countries in Europe and North America. As aptly argued by Turner, there is a mutual relationship between diaspora politics and the political field inside Burundi, which effectively constitutes a transnational political field (Turner, 2008). The developmental potential of diaspora input is only possible in the context of peace and stability in Burundi. These relationships therefore have implications for development depending on how the linkages and opportunities are utilized through the transnational political field, especially for the reconciliation and reconstruction processes. These are dimensions are addressed in this paper with an overview of the current state of migration and development in Burundi via an assessment of the different dimensions of migration that Burundi currently experiences as well a discussion of the state’s relationship with its diaspora.

This paper provides an overview of migration patterns and its development implications in Burundi over the course of the country’s history, contemporarily, and in the future. Chapter Two sketches Burundi’s current political, economic, and social situation to place Burundi’s migration history into context. Chapters Three and Four describe Burundi’s historic and current migration flows. The Burundian Diaspora is introduced in Chapter Five, and the impact of migration on development processes is discussed in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven surveys migration policies for Burundi, and Chapter Eight looks at the particular migration relationship between Burundi and the Netherlands. Potential future migration flows and its challenges will be discussed in Chapter Nine.

**Note on methodology**

Information for this chapter was gathered from September - November 2009 through desk-based study in the Netherlands. Additional data was collected through interviews conducted with Burundi Diaspora organizations and individuals who live in various cities in the Netherlands. During the study a number of limitations were encountered, which might have impact on the depth and comprehensiveness of data. For example, there is a

---

1 A combination of telephone and in-depth interviews were conducted with several Burundi Diaspora organizations between October and November 2009, in the cities of Almere, The Hague, Rotterdam and Maastricht in order to supplement the secondary data gathered through desk study.
marked lack of information documenting different aspects of remittance volumes and 
their utilization for home country development within the particular context of Burundi. 
Moreover, there is limited data on actual migration flows (immigration and emigration) 
between Burundi and the Netherlands. These relate to a lack of official documentation of 
Burundi migration and development policies as well as a lack of previous studies on 
Burundi diaspora in the Netherlands. This paper would thus largely provide the 
background analysis from which further studies on migration and development in 
Burundi and its relationships with the Netherlands could be pursued.
2. General Country Profile

Burundi is a small, landlocked country in the Central African Great Lakes Region. Its neighbouring countries are Rwanda to the North, Tanzania to the Southeast, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the West. Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank, 2009a) and has known many violent civil conflicts over the course of its history. This has resulted in large migration flows. To fully grasp the underlying causes of Burundi’s history of migration, it is important to look at Burundi’s economic, political, and social history. This section will provide a general overview of current and historic events and structures in Burundi in terms of its population, culture and ethnicity, economic situation, political situation, health, and history of conflict.

2.1 Population

With a surface area of 27.9 thousand square kilometres, and a population of 8.5 million people in 2007, Burundi is densely populated. The annual growth of the population in Burundi is estimated to be 2.8 percent in the period 2005 to 2010 (UN, 2008). Total average fertility rate in those years are expected to be 4.66 (ibid.) Burundi’s population is therefore expected to grow fast in the coming years.

Within Sub-Saharan Africa the youth population as a share of total population is high and rising (World Bank, 2008b). This is also the case for Burundi: 66 percent of Burundi’s population is between zero and 24 years old (World Bank, 2008b). Almost 94 percent of the youth (aged 18 or below) lives in rural areas. Employment levels are higher for adults than for the youth in Burundi: 95.8 percent of adult Burundians are employed while only 70.4 percent of their younger counterparts work. In addition, young urban people are more likely to be unemployed than their rural cohorts. More than 70 percent of all youth are literate but 25.6 percent do not attend school (World Bank, 2009b).

Education levels are low in Burundi. Only 36 percent of Burundi’s children complete primary school compared to an average of 60 percent for the Sub-Saharan Africa region in total (World Bank, 2008b). In 2000 a report presented by International Alert (Jackson, 2000) stated that most Burundian children did not receive formal education, and that boys had higher chances of receiving both primary and secondary education than girls. Another study found that urban youth are more likely to attend school than rural youth: 57 percent of urban youth attend while only 23 percent of rural children do (Garcia & Fares, 2007). The low quality level of education in Burundi is mainly a consequence of Burundi’s history of conflict. The 1993 civil war destroyed the
educational system in Burundi, one that was already weak before the war (Jackson, 2000). In addition, children often start working at a young age in Burundi: by the age of 13, 42 percent of the children are already working (Garcia & Fares, 2007).

2.2 Culture and ethnicity

Burundi consists of three primary ethnic groups: the Hutu (Bantu), the Tutsi (Hamitic), and the Twa (Pygmy). Eighty-five percent of Burundi’s population is Hutu, 14 percent is Tutsi, and 1 percent is Twa (Makoba & Ndura, 2006). The main languages spoken in Burundi are Kirundi, French, and Swahili. Both Kirundi and French are recognized as official languages, but most people speak Kirundi. Most of the Burundian population is Christian (67 percent), 23 percent follows traditional indigenous beliefs, and 10 percent is Muslim.

Both before and after the colonial period, which took place between 1897 and 1962, political power was mainly in the hands of the Tutsi minority in Burundi (see Table 1). This political dominance can be traced as far back as 400 years. Apart from internal power struggles within the Tutsi political elite, Burundi’s society was not characterized by conflict until the (post) Colonial era. Inter-ethnic marriage was common in the pre-colonial era and, consequently, no clear social distinctions existed between the two groups. It is argued that Hutus and Tutsi cohabitated in a hierarchical feudal society, and that it was not until the period of colonization that ethnic disparities were reinforced and emphasized, resulting in ethnic clashes in Burundi (Makoba & Ndura, 2006; Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005). In the years following independence in 1962, political leaders often used ethnic polarization as a means to reach their political goals (Makoba & Ndura, 2006). This will be discussed in more detail in section five, which describes Burundi’s history of civil conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tutsis</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutus</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Colonial history
Together with neighbouring country Rwanda, Burundi was under colonial rule of Germany between 1897 and 1914. The area was named Ruanda-Urundi and treated as a single territory. The Belgians, who invaded the area during World War I, governed the area of Ruanda-Urundi in the period 1916 to 1962. In 1923 Ruanda-Urundi (apart from the kingdoms located in the western part of the area) was officially ceded to Belgium. In total the occupation of the territory lasted for 68 years. During the occupation both the Germans and the Belgians applied indirect ruling by using the historical Tutsi political rule of aristocratic hierarchy in the area. The colonizers empowered the Tutsi domination over the Hutu majority in Ruanda-Burundi, providing them with better economic opportunities and social positions within society. Consequently, as described before, ethnic lines in the area were reinforced by what Makoba & Ndura (2006) call "[...] racist Belgian colonial policies and practices" (p. 297) in Ruanda-Urundi. This polarization of ethnicities led, among other things, to a history of violent civil conflict, which will be discussed in more detail in section 2.6 of this paper.

2.4 Economic situation
One of the main challenges Burundi faces today is poverty. Burundi has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world with only US $110 in 2007 (World Bank, 2009a). Rural households are especially affected by poverty (ibid.), as are young people. In Burundi 85.7 percent of the population aged between 15 and 24 lives below the US $2 a day poverty line. This is a high proportion, even within a region with an average youth poverty rate of 72 percent (World Bank, 2009b).

Burundi’s weak economic performance reflects the country’s history of civil war. Between 1993 and 2007, per capita income decreased by almost 40 percent (World Bank, 2009a). International aid also decreased substantially during those years, from US $300 million in 1992 to almost US $100 million in 2002 (Bundervoet & Verwimp, 2005). As a result the percentage of people living below the 1 dollar a day poverty line rose from 35 percent to 67 percent between 1993 and 2006 (World Bank, 2009a). The 1994 civil war directly affected the economic position of Burundians, but an economic embargo imposed on Burundi by neighbouring countries in 1996 as a protest to the coup by
President Pierre Buyoya also led to increased food prices, a development that highly affected nutritional states of rural households (Bundervoet & Verwimp, 2005).

Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2002) call Burundi’s economic performance in the period of 1960 to 2000 “catastrophic” (p. 1), and point mainly to political causes or the side effects of bad governance. Basdevant (2009) summarizes the causes of low Burundian growth rates as: “Lack of investment, civil conflict, economic inefficiencies, state intervention in the economy, and regulatory restrictions […] (p. 1)”.

Table 2 gives an overview of some economic indicators for the period 1980 to 1999 in Burundi. The reduction of international aid, which was already mentioned, is clearly shown in this table: one can see that international aid fell from US $46 per capita in 1999 to US $11 in 1999. Military expenditures rose substantially at the expense of health care and education, and GDP per capita declined in that period (Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005).

Table 2: Economic Indicators During the Period of Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average for the 1980s</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid per capita (US dollars)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditures (percent of government expenditures)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government expenditures (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US dollars)</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenue (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes on international trade (percent of total revenue)</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even though the country has recently shown positive economic developments, partly as a result of the 2000 economic reform program and debt relief in the mid-2000s, growth rates are too low for the country to bounce back to its pre-war economic level. According to the World Bank (2009a), GDP growth rates must be at eight percent in the coming years to regain the gross national income level of 1992. Instead, in the years 2001-2008, average GDP growth remained around three percent in Burundi.

Since economic development can play a large role in preventing future conflict, a sound economic system is a necessity in a poor and conflict-torn country such as Burundi (Baghdadli, Harborne & Rajadel, 2008). To stimulate growth Basdevant (2009) pleads for creating a market-friendly economy and good business climate in combination with good government policies and institutions.

---

2 As a response to the coup of the President, the United States of America also cancelled their humanitarian aid to Burundi. Eventually, the regional embargo on Burundi was suspended in 1999.
with donor assistance and low levels of government intervention. Basdevant further suggests that focus should be placed on the agricultural sector, specifically on the export-producing industries of coffee, tea, and sugar. Baghdadli, Harborne and Rajadel (2008) also argue that agriculture investments are key to Burundi’s economic reconstruction since this sector accounts for a large part of the country’s economy. The World Bank (2009a), however, warns that agriculture is a sector highly vulnerable to environmental shocks in Burundi (World Bank, 2009a).

2.5 Political situation

As previously stated Burundi gained political independence in 1962. A period of political stability initially followed (see Table 3) that was characterized by a combination of emerging democracy, military regimes, one-party state systems, and restricted democratic practices. After many fruitless attempts to reconstruct peace in Burundi, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accords were signed by seventeen Burundian political groups in August 2000.

Table 3: Political Situation in Burundi: 1962 - current

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Political situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962 – 1966</td>
<td>Emerging democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 – 1974</td>
<td>Military regime and one-party state (UPRONA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 – 1976</td>
<td>One-party state (UPRONA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 – 1979</td>
<td>Military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 – 1987</td>
<td>One-party state (UPRONA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 – 1992</td>
<td>Military regime and one-party state (UPRONA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 – 1993</td>
<td>Multi-party transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 – 1996</td>
<td>Restricted democratic practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 – 2001</td>
<td>Restricted democratic practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 – 2005</td>
<td>Transitional government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 - current</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Arusha Accords led the country into a transition phase between 2000 and 2005 to a multi-party democratic political system (Bentley & Southall, 2005). A transitional government based on a power sharing agreement between ethnicities was appointed in 2002. In a national referendum held in February 2005, the Burundians adopted a new,

---

3 In 2005, 90.6 percent of Burundi’s area land was used for agriculture, and agricultural practices accounted for 35 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2008a). Around 800,000 small farmers grow coffee. Over the last years, coffee constituted around 75 percent of export revenues (Basdevant, 2009).
4 Due to a draught in 2005, for example, GDP growth declined to 0.9 percent in that year (World Bank, 2009)
post-transition constitution. Within this constitution power sharing and the protection of minority rights were among the key elements. The National Assembly, for example, controls the division of political power in the government. In practice this means that 60 percent of the government should be Hutu, 40 percent should be Tutsi, and three percent should be Twa. In addition to this ethnic breakdown, 30 percent should be women.

Burundi currently has a multi-party political system with 21 officially-registered political parties. The CNDD, the FRODEBU (Front for Democracy in Burundi), and the UPRONA (National Unity and Progress Party) are the biggest parties. The PARENA (Party for National Redress), the ABASA (Burundi African Alliance for the Salvation), the PRP (People’s Reconciliation Party), the FNL (National Forces of Liberation), and the FROLINA/FAP (Front for the National Liberation of Burundi/Popular Armed Forces) are among the most important opposition parties (AED, 2006). The last parliamentary elections took place in August 2005, and Pierre Nkurunziza of the CNDD-FDD was elected by the Parliament for a five-year presidential term. The next elections will be held in 2010.

Even though Burundi has made political progress, the current political situation is fragile (Baghdadli, Harborne & Rajadel, 2008; Lemarchand, 2006; World Bank, 2009a). The Burundian government still struggles with the FNL, the last remaining active Hutu rebel group in the country. In May 2009 the FNL was registered as an official political party, and demobilization of the rebels is on the agenda. In addition some critics report human rights violations, corruption within the new government, and substantial challenges posed by the return of refugees (see e.g. Lemarchand, 2006).

2.6 History of conflict in Burundi

Burundi has a rich history of violent conflict, which started mainly in the mid-1960s only a few years after Burundi had gained its independence. Many Burundians have been affected by the violence. To quote Lemarchand (1996): “Nowhere else in Africa has so much violence killed so many people on so many occasions in so small space as in Burundi during the years following independence” (p. xix). The major civil conflicts took place in the years 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1991 (Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005). Table 4 summarizes Burundi’s civil wars from the 1960s on and shows its consequences.

In 1993 the most recent war took place in Burundi. This war started with the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically-elected Hutu president. As
Table 4 shows, the 1993 war, which lasted for 9 years, had the largest impact on Burundi’s population in terms of deaths and refugees. It resulted in over 300,000 casualties and the displacement of 1.2 million people (Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005; World Bank, 2009a). It affected not just certain provinces but the whole country, and it destroyed Burundi’s economic, political, and social infrastructure. The civil war ended officially in 2005, when Pierre Nkurunziza became the new Burundian president.

In 1972 around 100,000 people died in what Lemarchand (1996) calls: “one of the most appalling human rights violations in the annals of post independence Africa” (p. xxv). Genocide broke out in Burundi—the first of two in the period after 1962—in which the Tutsi Army killed primarily Hutus. As can be seen in Table 4, Ngaruku and Nkurunziza (2005) estimate the total number of casualties of Burundi’s 1972 Genocide at 200,000. Government groups were responsible for the deaths of almost 20,000 people in Northern Burundi in 1988 and almost 3,000 in 1991 (Lemarchand, 1996). Again, as can be derived from Table 4, the estimates vary. The majority of casualties were of Hutu origin.

**Table 4: Key Characteristics of Civil War in Burundi**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration (months)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths (thousands)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees (thousands)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of deaths plus refugees over total population (percent)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years from previous war</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cibitoke, Bujumbura</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces affected</td>
<td>Muramvya Whole country</td>
<td>Ngozi,  Kirundo</td>
<td>Cibitoke, Bujumbura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The root causes of conflict in Burundi are complex, debated, and strongly intertwined with regional and historical issues in the Central African Great Lakes Region. Conflicts often spread to neighbouring countries due to overlapping cultural identities in both countries, which has resulted, for example, in support from people from the same ethnic group across borders (Lemarchand, 2006; Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006). Lemarchand (1997) describes the process as follows: “Where ethnic fault-lines cut across national boundaries conflict tends to spill over from one area to the next, transforming kin solidarities into a powerful vector of transnational violence” (p. 178)
According to some, the frequency and reoccurrence of conflict in Burundi is due to the fact that, after independence, the political rulers in the country did not promote peace and stability but practiced politics along ethnic lines. To quote Ngaruku and Nkurunziza (2005, p. 35): “The exploitation of social divisions by opportunist political elites is at the heart of Burundi’s wars [...].” Makoba & Ndura (2006) also argue that the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi was, in essence, political instead of ethnic in nature. A combination of bad politics or governance failures and unresolved ethnic tensions led to a cyclical period of conflict in Burundi. This argument of political exclusion can be used for conflict in the whole Central African Great Lakes Region (Lemarchand, 1997). Ngaruku and Nkurunziza (2005) point to three major causes of civil war in Burundi in the postcolonial period: 1) the Belgian colonization of Burundi, 2) the exclusionary politics practiced by the Tutsi political elite after independence, and 3) the social revolution in Rwanda in 1959, leaving thousands of Rwandese killed and displaced. Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000), however, also point to poverty, which when combined with the struggle for Burundi’s resources and exclusionary politics had a big influence on the outbreak of violence.

The security situation is currently relatively stable in Burundi. After a cease-fire was adopted between the government and the last rebel group in the country in 2008, security increased. In 2009 no involuntary migration as a result of violent conflict took place (IDMC, 2009). Violations of the cease-fire have been reported as well, however (NRC, 2008). Moreover, as discussed in section 2.5, reports of human rights abuses, such as violence against civilians and political opponents, are still being published (see e.g. HRW, 2008; HRW, 2009; Lemarchand, 2006).

2.7 Health in Burundi

Burundi has been facing important health challenges, some of which are still urgent today. The infant mortality rate was 109 per 1,000 live births in 2007. This is high compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries (World Bank, 2008a). Burundi also has one of the highest prevalence of child malnutrition in the world (De Onis et al., 2004). Malnutrition prevalence for children (aged < 5) was 39 percent in 2000 (World Bank, 2008a). Maternal mortality is among the highest levels in Africa as well (World Bank, 2009a). The average life expectancy at birth for Burundians was 50.6 years in 2008 with the life expectancy for women sitting somewhat higher, at 51.7 years, than for men, at 48.8 years (UN, 2008).
In terms of diseases, malaria and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) pose serious health threats to Burundi (UNAIDS, 2004a; WHO, 2005). In 2000 a malaria epidemic was reported, affecting over 700,000 people in a month’s time and killing hundreds (Etchegeorry et al., 2001). In 2001 2,855,868 Burundians were clinically diagnosed with malaria, and 1,289 people died from the disease (WHO, 2004b). Burundi also has one of the highest adult HIV prevalence rates in the world (UN, 2005). After 1983, when the first person with AIDS was reported in Burundi, prevalence rates increased quickly, and HIV is now in second place for mortality causes among adults in Burundi (World Bank, 2009a). The prevalence for adults was 3,132 per 100,000 citizens in 2008 (WHO, 2008). The sharp increase of HIV prevalence is mainly due to the social and political crisis in the 1990s, poverty, and the displacement of many Burundians (WHO, 2008). The groups most at risk to get infected by HIV are people living in urban and semi-urban areas, people working in the sex industry or the armed forces, and the internally displaced. Young people and women have also higher chances of becoming infected, especially in urban areas. Women who live in refugee camps are more at risk as well due to their poor socioeconomic status (UNAIDS, 2004a; WHO, 2005).

The Burundian government acknowledges the severity of its health issues and has put different programs into place to fight the problems (UNAIDS, 2004; WHO, 2005). In 2002 a national program was implemented to make health care more accessible to poorer households (Lambert-Evans et al., 2009). Between 2005 and 2007 the Ministry of Health in Burundi even quadrupled its expenditures on health after successfully applying for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative of the IMF and the World Bank (WHO, 2008; World Bank, 2009a). Despite these efforts, however, Burundi will probably not reach its health Millennium Development Goals in 2015 (World Bank, 2009a), particularly as many Burundians are still excluded from health care (MSF, 2004).
3. Historical Overview of Migration in Burundi

From the 1960s on migration flows in Burundi have been substantial. Burundi was one of the largest migrant-sending countries in the world in the period 1960 to 1980 together with Rwanda, Mozambique, and countries located in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia (Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006). Most migrants were involuntary migrants, forced to leave their homes out of security reasons or to seek opportunities elsewhere. This chapter presents a historical overview of migration flows in and from Burundi for the period between roughly 1960 and 2000. The main trends as well as the main drivers of these migration flows are discussed. Since Burundian migration patterns were heavily embedded in regional migration issues in the Central African Great Lakes Region, the regional context is presented first.

3.1 Migration Patterns in the Great Lakes Region: 1960-2000

Conflict and displacement of large groups of people are characteristic for the whole region of Eastern Africa (Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006). Apart from some small labour migration flows to the coffee, tea, and cotton plantations in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi (Spaan & Moppes, 2006), most of the migrants in the Central African Great Lakes Region (consisting of Burundi, Rwanda, the north-eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, north-western Kenya, and Tanzania) were refugees, people trying to escape violent civil and political conflicts in their home country.

All countries in the Central African Great Lakes Region have known refugee immigration and refugee emigration flows at some point in time. Countries often even received and sent refugees simultaneously (Rwamatara, 2005). As a result of the 1959 revolution in Rwanda, Burundi hosted refugees from Rwanda, mainly Tutsis, escaping the violent power transfer to the Hutu majority in their country (Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005). In 1975 almost 350,000 refugees were hosted by Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Most of these refugees came from neighbouring countries (Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006). At the end of the 1980s, Burundi and Rwanda collectively received more than 50,000 refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire). Then, due to the ongoing conflict situation in Rwanda, Burundi housed almost 250,000 Rwandans at the end of 1993 (Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006). When the Rwandan genocide broke out in 1994, almost 300,000 Rwandans fled to the neighbouring Burundi and Uganda. At the beginning of the 1990s, all countries in the region were home to a substantial amount of refugees. The largest population of refugees could be found in
Zaire. In the late 1990s, however, more than 50,000 former refugees from Zaire were again hosted by Rwanda and Burundi (UNHCR, 1999).

Conflict and migratory flows have evolved into a cyclical pattern in the Central African Great Lakes Region. Conflict generates refugees, and large flows of involuntary migrants can then have an impact on conflict. Instability increases, also outside the real conflict zone, for conflicts are often transferred by the migrants (Hovil, 2008). Rwamatwara (2005) states, for example: “In some countries, failure to find a permanent solution to the refugee problem has pushed uprooted people to organize themselves to force their way back home through military means and this has caused more waves of population displacement. The cases of Rwanda and Burundi are good examples” (p. 179). In the Central African Great Lakes Region, local rebel groups were often able to increase their activities after military groups who were defeated joined them (ibid.). This has led to spill-over effects of violent conflict across countries. Moreover, return migrants can bring back old tensions when they move to their home countries again (Hovil, 2008).

3.2 International migration from Burundi: 1960-2000

Burundi has experienced different waves of out-migration in the period 1960-2000. Most of these migration flows were conflict-induced, and the majority of refugees fled to neighbouring countries such as Tanzania, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Burundi also served as a refugee-hosting country in that period, receiving refugees from neighbouring countries that struggled with political and civil conflict. This section provides an overview of the most important refugee flows from and to Burundi and places them in historic context.

3.2.1 Refugee flows from Burundi

When looking at the root causes of refugee flows in Burundi, the impact of civil conflict in the country cannot be overlooked. As discussed in section two, Burundi has experienced five major civil conflicts in the period between 1960 and 2000. These took place in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991, and 1993. The 1972 and 1993 conflicts generated especially large migration flows. In 1972 the violent actions of the Burundian military against the Hutu population in the country led to a refugee movement of around 300,000 people, most of whom fled to Tanzania (ICG, 2003; Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005). The 1988 and 1991 conflicts generated relatively small refugee flows with the former producing 50,000 refugees and latter producing 38,000 (Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005).
In 1993, however, the violence that followed the assassination of president Ndadaye led to an estimated 687,000 refugees (ICG, 2003; Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005). The violence after 1993 lasted for almost nine years and generated refugees in small waves after each outburst of violence.

The Burundian refugee flow is also depicted in Table 5, which shows the net migration rate for Burundi in the period 1950-2000.\(^5\) In the 1950s and 1960s the net migration rate was stable but low. This means that more people left the country than entered. After 1965 a small increase of emigrants is shown, leading to a clear drop in the net migration rate between 1970 and 1975. Between 1990 and 1995, and then again between 1995 and 2000, the net migration rate also heavily decreased. By 1999 14 percent of the Burundian population was displaced (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza, 2005). With these low net migration rates, Burundi is one of the countries with the highest levels of out-migration in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1990 to 2000 (Lucas, 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net migration rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1955</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1960</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1965</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1970</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1975</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1980</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-2000</td>
<td>-12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN, 2008. Note: migration rates are per 1,000 of the population.

3.2.2 Main destinations

As stated earlier most 1972 refugees crossed the border of their country in the east, fleeing to neighbouring Tanzania (ICG, 2003; Ngaruku & Nkurunziza, 2005). Over 200,000 Burundian refugees eventually settled in Tanzania, where three large refugee settlements were established in the west that were called the 'Old Settlements'. All refugee families were given five hectares of land each in the settlement and eventually became self-sufficient (Thomson, 2009). The Old Settlements eventually hosted the Burundian refugees for around 36 years. Tanzania had adopted a long-term policy to integrate both Rwandan and Burundian refugees, for which the country was positively

\(^5\) The net migration rate is calculated as the number of people entering the country minus the number of people leaving the country, per 1000 inhabitants.
recognized internationally (Rwamatwara, 2005). It was not until 2007 that a policy shift emerged to help refugees return to Burundi (Thomson, 2009. This shift in refugee policies, which can be seen in different countries in other Sub-Saharan countries as well, will be discussed in the next chapter. Other Burundian refugees who entered Tanzania after 1972 were placed in refugee camps in Northwestern Tanzania.

### 3.3 Internal migration within Burundi: 1960-2000

Internal migration patterns in Burundi for the period 1960-2000 mainly consisted of large flows of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as individuals forcibly relocated by the Burundian government.

#### 3.3.1 Internal displacement

Not all Burundians that sought refuge elsewhere fled to neighbouring countries; many became internally displaced in their own country. The 1972 civil conflict, for example, resulted in large numbers of IDPs in Burundi. In 1993, when an estimated nine percent of the Burundian population fled to neighbouring countries, 12 percent of the population sought refuge in other areas within Burundi (UNOCHA estimates, 1993). This led to large IDP sites within Burundi, a development the country still struggles with today. These sites in Burundi will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter on current migration flows in Burundi.

#### 3.3.2 Relocation policies

Forced relocation, also called ‘regroupement’, is defined as “[…] the forced movement of entire communities, usually by a government, to permanent or semi permanent sites often directly or indirectly under the control of military units” (Bennett, 2000, p. 27). A government often claims to protect its citizens by regrouping them into areas controlled by the state. In most cases, however, the government uses the relocation as a counter-insurgency strategy. According to Bennett (2000), “the negative consequences of forced relocation are most starkly demonstrated by a ruthless policy deployed in Burundi” (p. 30).

In 1996 the Burundian government launched a long-term policy to relocate Burundian citizens into ‘regroupement camps’, or ‘sites’. This policy was abandoned again in 1997. During 1998, however, people were still forced to move by the Burundian government, especially in the west. The Burundian government started a large-scale
relocation project in September 1999, relocating around 380,000 (mostly Hutu) Burundians in 53 different sites (IDCM, 2009). The official statement on the relocation project was that citizens were to be protected against rebel attacks. Critiques, however, point to human rights violations of the Burundian government, for the relocation sites were often not well equipped to fulfil the basic needs of the people. Moreover, the government controlled the sites, and relocation procedures were often ruthless and forced (see e.g. Bennett, 2000). IDMC (2009) states that, counter to the official statement made by the Burundian government, the regroupment sites were constructed as a military strategy to avoid the support of local citizens to the rebel groups. In 2000 the regroupment sites were closed as a result of international actors criticizing the government’s policy. Other internal displacement sites remained, however, and the number of IDPs is still a challenge for Burundi. This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
4. Current Migration Patterns

This chapter focuses on current migration patterns in Burundi, starting from around the year 2000. These migration patterns include both international and national migration of Burundians. Again, however, a regional perspective is presented first.

4.1 Current regional migration in the Great Lakes Region

Table 6 presents the numbers of refugees and IDPs for the Central African Great Lakes Region in 2009. As this table shows, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the largest numbers of refugees and IDPs living in other countries. For Burundi the refugees are mainly Hutus who had fled the 1972 Burundian massacre who now live in Tanzania. Tanzania, together with Kenya, currently hosts the most of the refugees. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has the largest number of IDPs followed by Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi. This is due to recent fighting in the northwest of the country. Within six month’s time (between June 2008 and January 2009) the number of IDPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has increased from 1,250,000 to 1,460,102.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Refugees from</th>
<th>Refugees in</th>
<th>IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>281,592</td>
<td>21,093</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>72,530</td>
<td>55,062</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>367,995</td>
<td>155,162</td>
<td>1,460,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>7,548</td>
<td>162,132</td>
<td>853,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9,688</td>
<td>320,605</td>
<td>404,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>321,909</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since the situation in the Central African Great Lakes Region is relatively stable at the moment, repatriation solutions are currently being sought for most of the long-term refugees such as the Burundians in Tanzania and the Rwandese in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This will be discussed in section 6, which addresses the issue of return migration.
4.2 Current international Burundian migration

Burundi has been both a migrant-receiving and migrant-sending country. In 2009, however, the number of Burundian refugees residing in other countries exceeded the number of refugees the country hosted. Table 7 presents the migration status of Burundi for the year 2009. As this table shows, Burundi currently hosts over 20,000 refugees and over 5,000 asylum seekers. More than 280,000 refugees from Burundi live in other countries. A large number of Burundi’s refugees have already returned to the country: more than 95,000 people had returned to Burundi by January 2009. It is important to note Burundi’s high number of IDPs, a topic that will be discussed in the section on internal migration in Burundi. The next sections discuss Burundi’s migration status in more detail.

Table 7: Migration In and From Burundi: 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residing in Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>21,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Seekers</td>
<td>5,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned Refugees</td>
<td>95,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned IDPs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Persons</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population of Concern</td>
<td>221,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Originating from Burundi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>281,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Seekers</td>
<td>6,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned Refugees</td>
<td>95,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned IDPs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population of Concern</td>
<td>483,626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, January 2009.

4.2.1 Burundi as a refugee-sending country

Table 8 shows the number of Burundian refugees as of October 2009. As described earlier Tanzania currently hosts most of Burundi’s refugees as a result of the 1972 civil conflict. This number has drastically decreased over the years, however. The International Crisis Group (2003) reports in 2003 that more than 800,000 Burundians were hosted by Tanzania at that time: 500,000 refugees were living in refugee camps in

6 The numbers in this table slightly differ from the ones presented in Table x. This is due to the fact that the numbers presented in Table x are from October 2009, and the ones in Table x from January 2009. In the meantime, many Burundian refugees have returned from Tanzania.
the West of Tanzania, and 300,000 were scattered across the country. An estimated 200,000 Burundians currently live in Tanzania. More than 17,500 Burundian refugees currently reside in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a small number live in Uganda and Rwanda (UNHCR, 2009a).

4.2.2 Burundi as a refugee-hosting country
Burundi currently hosts around 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see Table 9). A small number of Rwandese refugees live in Burundi as well (UNHCR, 2009a). The Rwandan refugees mainly live in Giharo (Rutana) refugee camp in Eastern Burundi (UNHCR, 2009c). The Congolese refugees live in Bwagiriza (Ruyigi), Gaworwe (Muyinga), and Musasa (Ngozi) refugee camps in Eastern and Northern Burundi. More than 10,000 registered Congolese also sought refuge and asylum in Burundi’s cities. These ‘urban refugees’ struggle in the urban areas, and many have requested to move to the refugee camps as well. UNHCR missions run most of the refugee camps, providing shelter, food and education (ibid.).

The Congolese refugees in Burundi mostly come from the South Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The largest in-flow of refugees from that region took place in June 2004. The Congolese refugees from the South Kivu Province are unlikely to return in the near future due to ongoing violence in that province between FDLR (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda) rebels from Rwanda and the Congolese army (FARD) (ibid.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of asylum</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>17,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>208,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>229,878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, 2009a.
### Table 9: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Burundi: October 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Number of refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>30,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,754</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, 2009a.

#### 4.3 Current Internal Burundian migration

Current internal Burundian migration patterns consist of rural-urban migration and the return of IDPs from settlements in Northern and Central Burundi to their original homes.

#### 4.3.1 Internally Displaced Persons in Burundi

Burundi hosts thousands of internally displaced persons, Burundians that have fled their homes but have not crossed the border and instead sought refugee in safer places within their own country. In 2003 the International Crisis Group (2003) reported 281,000 permanent internally displaced persons in Burundi. Those IDPs were scattered over approximately 226 officially-registered camps. In the same year the number of IDPs within Burundi increased by almost 100,000 people each month because of the civil conflict that still raged in the country. As a result of the peace agreement between the last rebel group Palipehutu-FNL and the Burundian government in 2003 and the successful elections in 2005, the number of IDPs has decreased substantially in Burundi (IDMC, 2008). In 2004 the number of IDPs had already decreased to 140,000 living in 182 camps.

Burundi currently has around 100,000 IDPs, living in approximately 160 camps (Lemarchand, 2006, UNHCR, 2009). These camps, or sites, are mainly located in Northern and Central Burundi. Most of the IDPs living in those camps migrated in the late 1990s or early 2000s due to civil, and over the years many IDPs have become integrated in their new environments. Most of the IDPs consequently favour the option to stay at their current location (IDMC, 2009).

For the IDPs who have not integrated, living conditions in the camps are poor, just as for other refugees and returnees. Despite joint efforts of the Burundian

---

7 It is difficult to estimate the number of IDPs in the country though, due to unavailability of reliable data (UNHCR, 2009c)
government and several international actors such as the UN Peace Building Commission and the UNHCR, the situation of IDPs in Burundi has not improved much in recent years (IDCM, 2008). Most IDPs do not own land and live on properties that belong to the state, to churches, or to private owners. Since land is a scarce asset in densely-populated Burundi, this has led to disputes over land and properties (ibid.). The poor living conditions of IDPs and other refugees is contested, however, by the Burundian government, which conducted a survey of refugees and IDPs in the country in 2006 and found that living conditions did not differ much from those of local Burundians (UNHCR, 2009c).

4.3.2 Rural-urban migration

In Africa the percentage of people living in urban areas is rapidly increasing. Even though research on migration and urbanization in Africa suffers from a lack of reliable data, urbanization is a documented trend in Africa (Landau, 2007). In Burundi urbanization seems to be only a recent trend. At the end of the twentieth century, Burundi, together with Rwanda, was one of the least urbanized countries in Africa (UNEP, 2000). In 2008 over ten percent of Burundi’s population lived in urban areas while 35 percent of the total population of Sub-Saharan Africa lived in urban areas in that year. Current urbanization growth is increasing for Burundi, however: the urbanization growth in 2008 was 6.1 percent, compared to 3.8 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2008b). Table 10 provides an overview of Burundi’s urban population as a percentage of the total population for the period between 1950 and 2030. As this table shows, the UN estimates the percentage or urban population in Burundi to increase sharply in the coming years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (percent)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Population Division Database, 2005

Urban growth often places pressure on the facilities of urban areas and might lead to increasing poverty in those areas. As UN HABITAT (2006) reports, 72 percent of

Available at: http://esa.un.org/unpp/
Africa’s urban population currently lives in slums, and this number is increasing steadily. Bundervoet (2006), however, researched poverty levels in Burundi in both rural and urban areas and found that poverty is still more common in rural areas than in Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura. An estimated 71.5 percent of the rural population and 36.5 percent of the urban population is affected by poverty. The high incidence of poverty in rural areas is mainly explained by low educational levels and the fact that the civil war had a larger effect on the rural population. Poverty inequality levels are higher in Burundi’s urban area, though, and with Burundi’s high population and high urban growth, poverty levels are likely to increase in Burundi’s urban areas.

The urbanization trend and its consequences in Burundi are acknowledged by the Burundian government, and in April 2008 the National Housing and Urban Development Policy was implemented. This policy aims to improve urban planning in the country by means of implementing a legal, financial, and institutional framework for it. This will be done with the help of UNDP and UN HABITAT and will engage local authorities, NGOs, CBOs, and the national government. The goal of the housing and urbanization policy is to improve access to housing and assets to the poor, which will help Burundi reach the MDGs (UN HABITAT, 2008).
5. Burundian Diaspora in the Netherlands

Burundi’s history of civil conflict and the resulting refugee flows have led to the emergence of a large Burundian diaspora network around the world. The Burundian diaspora is large and actively involved in development processes in their home country by means of mobilisation through formal and informal organizations. Through these organisations members of the diaspora are able to address their welfare needs in the host countries while at the same time mobilising resources for community development projects that they implement in Burundi. This chapter discusses the emergence of the Burundian diaspora (with special reference to the Netherlands), the viewpoints of the Burundian diaspora, and their activities in Burundi.

To have a clear view and understanding of the size and characteristics of the Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands, it is necessary to relate their origins to the wider Burundian diaspora and to the migratory patterns shaped by events in Burundi. By connecting them to the wider Burundian diaspora, it becomes possible to shed more light on the evolution of the Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands because many members of the diaspora have passed through different levels and phases of transition before finally arriving in the Netherlands. Some of these transitional phases of immigration occurred in the regions and countries in which individuals took refuge before further relocation to the Netherlands. This factor also determines the diaspora’s numbers/population in host countries as well as the group’s transnational mobility between and among the various host and final destination countries in Europe and North America. Attempts to track this migratory path would therefore facilitate the explication of the Burundian diasporic and transnational networks as well as the linkages the diaspora are developing with their homeland.

5.1 Tracing the origins

Of an estimated population of 8.03 million inhabitants (World Bank, 2009), Burundi’s net migration rate is estimated at 5.5 migrants / 1,000 in the population. Other estimates indicate that about 315,447 Burundians are emigrants (Ratha and Xu, 2008), while international migration account for 1.3% of its population. Women account for 53.6% of the Burundian international migrants (IOM, 2002; UNDP, 2005). Due to the absence of precise national data in Burundi, estimation of the size of the Burundian diaspora is

---

9 Data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division's World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database
largely dependent upon the figures provided by relevant agencies in the host countries. It
would moreover be imperative to differentiate between those who are internally
displaced, those who crossed the borders as refugees (estimated in 2009 at 281,592 by
UNHCR), and those who have sought asylum in Europe and North America. The three
categories make up the Burundi diaspora even though some may be closer to the home
country. These categories are also embedded in the broader description of the migration
patterns in Burundi, which include internal versus international, permanent versus
circular, regular versus irregular, and voluntary versus forced migration (See IOM, 2008).

The complexity inherent to the differentiation and categorization of Burundians
living outside their country has implications for the overall use of the term diaspora to
refer to Burundians abroad. For the purpose of this paper, Burundian diaspora is used to
refer to all Burundians living outside the country as refugees, temporary residents,
permanent residents, or naturalised citizens of other countries. This broad definition is
informed by the fact that Burundian diaspora has evolved over time and moved from
one state of being abroad to another, especially as refugees who later become permanent
residents or naturalised citizens of their adopted countries. Some of these migration
processes began with internal displacement within Burundi, followed by movement into
neighbouring countries and later to Europe and North America (IOM, 2005). In addition
to its own internally-displaced population (estimated at 100,000 people), Burundi is also
host to large numbers of refugees from other countries within the Great Lakes region,
notably 9,849 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)\textsuperscript{10} The mass
dislocations in Burundi are due to inter-ethnic conflict and armed conflict between
government and rebel forces in the north and western parts of the country\textsuperscript{11} (also see
IDMC, 2009).

\textsuperscript{10} UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c056
\textsuperscript{11} Interview, 26/11/2009. According to Bennett (1999, p27), displacements in Burundi are characterized by
"forced relocation or re-groupment of entire communities, usually by a government, to permanent or semi-
permanent sites often directly or indirectly under the control of military units"
According to the Credit Bank of Bujumbura, there are about 10,000 Burundians living in the European Union (EU), 3,000 in the USA and Canada, and about 300 in Asia (de Bryun and Wets, 2006). This group of Burundian immigrants is composed of first-generation migrants who moved to Europe during the first conflict in 1972, students who remained upon completion of their studies, business people, and individuals who migrated via family reunification procedures over the past two decades. Out of the 10,000 Burundians in Europe, about 3,300 are living in the Netherlands according to official figures (CBS, 2009). The majority came as political asylum seekers or through other procedures such as family reunification (Zlotnik, 1998). Although their numbers are not known, undocumented Burundians, some of whom had their asylum requests

---

12 Banque de Crédit de Bujumbura (BCB)
rejected or came into the Netherlands through other means, are also resident in the Netherlands.

5.2 Burundians in the Netherlands: size and status

The first major inflow of Burundians to the Netherlands took place in 1993 following the intensification of conflict in their country. The group is mixed, however, and fits similar characteristics noted by de Bruyn and Wets (2006). In a study on remittances in the Great Lakes Region, de Bruyn and Wets (2006, p33), also observed that Burundian diaspora in Europe and North America consists of a diversified group of high- and low-income people, political refugees, undocumented migrants and regular migrants, and low- and highly skilled people with their families. As pointed out by Van Heelsum (2001; 2), asylum seekers in the Netherlands are “a diverse group with mainly four types of legal status: ·1- asylum seeker, -2- all kinds of in between status like permit for temporary stay (v-VTV), -3- A- status: accepted refugees with a refugee passport (who are officially stateless) or C-status (VT), and -4- refugees that have taken Dutch nationality”. In the case of Burundians, estimates between the 1st quarter of 2007 and the 3rd quarter of 2009 suggest that there are about 400 asylum seekers from Burundi in the Netherlands (CBS, 2009). Table 1 below covers the period between 2007 and 2008 and gives a breakdown in terms of sex and age.

Table 11: Burundi Asylum Requests in the Netherlands by Sex and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>Total asylum requests</td>
<td>First asylum requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Total men and women All ages</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger than 15 years</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 17 years</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 years or older</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Netherlands, 2009

---

13 CBS (2009) Available at http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/default.aspx?DM=SLEN&PA=03740ENG&D1=a&D2=0%2c6%2c8-9%2c12%2c14%2c21%2c23%2c25%2c26%2c27%2c28%2c37%2c42%2c45%2c48&D3=a&D4=a&LA=EN&HDR=T%2cG1&STB=G2%2cG3&VW=T
According CBS\textsuperscript{14} figures there were approximately 2,977 Burundians in the Netherlands in 2007, 3,228 in 2008, and 3,380 in 2009 (CBS, 2009)(see figure 1). These figures largely capture groups that are accessible in public spheres through service agencies, and migrants who do not visit such offices thus hardly appear in the official estimates.

**Figure 2: Burundian Population in the Netherlands by Sex, Age and Marital Status**

(Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009\textsuperscript{15}).

The number of recorded asylum seekers in the last three years amounted to 250 individuals with 80 applications lodged in 2006, 140 in 2007, and 30 in 2009 (CBS, 2009). Between 2005 and 2008, about 640 asylum seekers were granted permanent resident permits and 920 were granted temporary residence permits, bringing the total number of residence permits issued to Burundian asylum seekers to 1,570 within a period of four years (see Table 12 below). The reduction in the number of asylum requests in 2009 can be partly explained by a Dutch migration policy shift toward return migration, especially in the context of return to peace in Burundi, the ongoing peace process, and two previous democratic elections.

\textsuperscript{14} Central Bureau of Statistics (2009), Available at http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLEN&PA=71924eng&D1=a&D2=4&D3=4-7&LA=EN&HDR=T,G2,G1&CHARTYPE=1&VW=T
Table 12: Residence Permits Granted to Burundian Asylum Seekers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Total residence permits</th>
<th>Temporary residence permits</th>
<th>Permanent Residence Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>600 600 260 110</td>
<td>390 350 110 70</td>
<td>200 240 160 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009

Between 1995 and 2008 about 3,234 Burundians became naturalised citizens of the Netherlands (CBS, 2009). There are no estimates for the number of undocumented Burundians despite their acknowledged existence within the wider migrant community. The majority of Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands are mainly from the two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsis. The Twa are conspicuously missing and their position or situation in Burundi is not part of the diaspora discourse. One possible explanation for their absence in the diaspora could be due to their state of economic and political marginalization, which informed their inability to move to places such as Europe and North America during the civil war. Their absence is evident within various Burundi migrant communities as well as in the asylum centres and existing diaspora organizations across the Netherlands.

5.3 Burundi migrants and organisations: Location and organizing

Like many other asylum seekers in the Netherlands, Burundians who are under asylum procedures are usually located in temporary accommodation in different parts of the Netherlands. The first location of stay upon receiving permission to stay in the Netherlands is often determined by the Dutch Refugee Council (Vereniging Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland) and Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Centraal Orgaan opvang asielzoekers), which decides in which local municipality

---

17 http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/default.aspx?DM=SLNL&PA=03742&D1=a&D2=0&D3=0&D4=37&D5=0&D6=a&VW=T
18 http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/
19 http://www.vluchtelingenorganisaties.nl/
(Gemeente) that an asylum seeker should stay. Those with temporary or permanent residency permits or naturalized citizens are spread across the country.

Burundians with long-term stay permits, naturalised citizens, and highly skilled migrants are allowed to move freely in the Netherlands with the majority concentrated in major cities in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{20} Most Burundians with long-term residency permits and Dutch citizenship are well established in various cities such as The Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Eindhoven, Gouda, Culemborg, Lochem, and Almere.\textsuperscript{21} Some are also found in the south of the Netherlands in a region close to Belgium, a situation largely influenced by the Belgian historical connection with Burundi and the region’s proximity to Brussels, which is a major location of Burundians in Europe (Mascini, et al 2009) and the main hub for transnational links and home-bound activities.

There are about 20 Burundian diaspora organizations\textsuperscript{22} in the Netherlands including both formal and informal groups. The majority of these organisations\textsuperscript{23} are registered with the chamber of commerce (KvK)\textsuperscript{24} upon meeting legislative requirements. This process facilitates their transformation into formal organizations that are recognized by the public, government departments, and development agencies from which they receive funding for various activities. By acquiring formal status, registered Burundian diaspora groups are able to undertake activities in the public sphere as well as engage with other migrant groups nationwide and with EU-level diaspora platforms.

In addition to formal Burundian diaspora organisations, there are other informal groups organised along the lines of ethnicity, family, friends, and village of origin in Burundi. Although these informal groups are not officially recognized and in most cases remain anonymous, these informal associational units also play a significant role in diaspora mobilization as well as the transfer of remittances to next of kin in Burundi.

Most Burundi diaspora organisations are based in the same regions or cities in which their members or leadership reside. This is mainly for logistical reasons as well as to facilitate group activities. The formal Burundian diaspora organisations are well organized and have clear leadership structures. While the leadership of many organisations is comprised entirely of officials of Burundian background, some groups feature mixed leadership comprised of both Burundians and Dutch people. This is a feature that is common in most diaspora organisations that emphasize the necessity of

\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Stichting Tabarana, November 25, 2009
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Stichting Tabarana, November 26, 2009 and Burundi in Action, October 28, 2009.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview with BWPD November 26, 2009
\textsuperscript{23} See appendix 1 for a list of the known Burundi organizations
\textsuperscript{24} http://www.kvk.nl/english/aboutus/default.asp
integration within Dutch society by incorporating Dutch people into their activities both in the Netherlands and the country of origin (Ongáyo, 2009). Many organisations have websites and provide complete contact details as well as much more elaborate information about their activities. The languages commonly used by Burundian diaspora organisations include Kirundi, French, Swahili, and Dutch. On their organisational websites Dutch, French, and English are widely used. The majority of these projects have a country-wide focus even though some activities may be targeted at specific regions within Burundi.

5.4 Divisions within the diaspora in the Netherlands

It has been noted that “Burundi has experienced a shift from binary conflict between two irreconcilable positions based on ethnicity - two positions that could not even agree on what the conflict was about” (Lemarchand 1996, cited in Turner 2008). This picture may reflect the situation on the ground, but within the diaspora in the Netherlands, divisions still exist even if they are not openly displayed. The disagreements within the Burundi community in the Netherlands exhibit a multiplicity of opinions and alliances, which are largely informed by ethnic fault lines still emanating from the country of origin. A careful examination is also necessary to make a distinction between the perspectives of Burundian migrants migrating for reasons other than to seek asylum and asylum seekers. Refugees with varied experiences in the conflict at home, for instance, may have a different perspective on the unity of groups within the diaspora than those individuals who migrated outside of such a conflict context. To refugees there may be strong differences within the group (Wahlbeck 2003, p234). Furthermore the two waves of immigration to the Netherlands that occurred in the 1970s and 1990s were largely characterized by ethnicity. Those individuals who left in the first wave were mainly Hutus while more recent arrivals are Tutsis, many of whom are running away from the realities on the ground following shifts in power after the first democratic elections in 1993 and 2005.

5.4.1 Diversity in the Burundian community

In relation to the position and viewpoints of Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands, the divisions between different groups reflect their heterogeneous nature (also see Turner 2008, pp1164-5). They consist of a diversified group (de Bruyn and Wets 2006, p33) with characteristics informed by cleavages such as ethnicity, gender, and status prior to
immigration. The transitional experiences in Burundi and subsequent changes in power relations cause ripples that are also felt in the diaspora, and these forces thus help shape the character of Burundi diaspora in the Netherlands. These characteristics also inform the nature of the diaspora’s relations as well as discourses and positions about the situation in their homeland and the continued creation of factions (Turner, 2008 p1164). Most individuals observe that these divisions and the ongoing conflict at home make diaspora unity and collaboration difficult.\textsuperscript{25}

In terms of their ability to make an impact as a group through remittances and the transfer of human, social, and political capital, most Burundians see their recent arrival and numbers in the Netherlands as a limiting factor that their Belgium cohort has not faced to the same degree. The first generation of Burundian migrants and first refugees only arrived in the Netherlands in 1995 from camps in Tanzania, Kenya, and the Uvira area in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). From these camps it has been difficult for many Burundians to get asylum in Europe, especially for those who did not have links with earlier arrivals (Koser and Van Haar, 2003). The relative calm in Burundi has also led to a policy shift, especially in the Netherlands, which has consequently reduced the number of Burundians seeking asylum in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{26} Furthermore, with limited possibilities to access the labour market due to unrecognized educational qualifications and language barriers, many Burundians have moved on to French-speaking countries in Europe and North America. This mobile group is largely comprised of professionals but also includes those who move to join family members.

5.4.2 Minority fighting majority in the diaspora

Interviews with many Burundians reveal an underlying suspicion of various groups, especially between the Hutus and Tutsis. Although not part of the Dutch Burundi diaspora scene, other Burundi diaspora websites (Turner, 2008)\textsuperscript{27} (mainly operated in Belgium and other European and North American destinations) are full of discourses that reveal a possible link between the diaspora groups and conflict in the country of origin. Although there is no open support for the antagonists in Burundi by Burundians in the Netherlands, linkages through international networks and other forms of solidarity and political practices (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001) constitute a plausible scenario in which

\textsuperscript{25} Interview, November 26, 2009, Rotterdam
\textsuperscript{26} Interview, November 25, 2009, The Hague
\textsuperscript{27} For details, see the following Burundi websites: www.arib.info, www.danbu/bienvenue.html; www.netpress.bi; www.burundi-sites.info; www.umuco.com
the diaspora provide support in one way or the other to actors in the conflict on the ground. As aptly argued by Koinova, conflict-generated diasporas are often prone to support various warring factions in the homeland with lobbying and fund-raising activities and by recruiting soldiers from within their own communities (Koinova, 2009:1) (Also see Lyons, 2006, Shain, 2007/2002). These observations have also been noted elsewhere and posit that the diaspora are able to perpetuate conflicts in their countries of origin, especially if they are still affected by the traumas from the conflict. The feelings of traumatic experiences are captured by a general perception of many Burundians, especially of Hutu background, who become part of the diaspora against their will. They emphasize this notion by stating that “the oppressed are all here, and both sides – the oppressed and oppressors are represented in the diaspora.” This view partly explains the complexities and problems related to disunity among Burundians in the Netherlands, but it is also a potential obstacle to their contribution to democratization and peace-building efforts in Burundi.

Although most Burundians still mobilize and organise along ethnic lines, there are also groups that organize along professional lines. Examples include the groups Burundi in Action (BIA) in Almere, Reragakura in Gauda, and Burundi Women for Peace and Development (BWPD) in Rotterdam (cf. Appendix 1). The majority receive financial support from Dutch development agencies such as the Inter-church Organisation for Development Co-operation (ICCO), the Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid (CORDAID), the National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development (NCDO), the Dutch Organisation for International Aid (Oxfam-NOVIB), and in some cases the organisations work in collaboration with government departments and local authorities. Another notable characteristic of Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands that is worth noting is that they are not economic refugees, especially the first generation. The majority consider themselves as victims of the conflict or conflict-generated diaspora (Smith, 2007; Shain 2002). For this reason they consider themselves as purely political refugees. This view is reinforced by the observation that most Burundian diasporas are often focused on the political developments at home through the radio and Internet, venues through which they can engage in cyber wars of words (Turner, 2008). As conflict-generated diaspora,

---

29 Interview, November 2009
30 Interview with BWPD, November 26, 2009 – Rotterdam
Burundians in the Netherlands exhibit a propensity to remit for peace-building/reconstruction, to maintain symbolic ties, and to contribute to rebel finance, motivations that conflict-generated diaspora all largely share (See Newman and Richmond, 2006).

6. Migration and Development in Burundi

As in many developing countries, the different dimensions of migration affect Burundi. In addition to the challenge of handling more than 100,000 internally displaced and 95,389 returned refugees (UNHCR, 2009) as well as refugees still expected to return from camps in Tanzania and other locations in the region, the country also experiences the heavy impact of migration in terms of brain drain in key sectors as a result of outward migration (forced and voluntary). The absence of qualified manpower is, therefore, a major challenge for the ongoing efforts towards reconciliation and reconstruction. Burundi has yet to find a long lasting solution to the problems associated with internal displacement and reintegration \(^{31}\) of the returning refugees from neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2009).

A clear link between migration and development, and guidance on how to realize the developmental potential of migration from a policy perspective, is still premature to establish in Burundi. This is due to the lack of appropriate migration and development policies in Burundi, which could be explained by the fact that the country is just emerging from a brutal civil war and has yet to undertake comprehensive national reconciliation procedures as a precondition for national reconstruction and development, in which migration is just one component. Burundi’s development in relation to migration is, therefore, linked to the ongoing peace and democratization processes and the involvement of various stakeholders both within the country and from the diaspora, which could eventually tap into the developmental potentials of migration (HDR, 2009; Adepoju, 2008).

The preoccupation with conflict resolution and implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord\(^ {32}\) and other instruments intended for the stability of the country combined

---


with political dynamics might not give much space for migration and development policy as a priority in the political agenda. In line with the ongoing debates about migration and development, however, the Burundian government has recognized the developmental potential of migration especially via the impact of remittances (de Bruyn and Wets, 2006); despite this recognition, the state still lacks the necessary institutional frameworks and adequate policy instruments\textsuperscript{33} to harness diaspora potential. The Burundian government has yet to come up with policies and institutional frameworks that would enable it to develop synergies between migration and development agendas, and it has likewise failed to examine how migration could be mainstreamed into its development policy agenda. This would include focusing on partnerships and engaging with its diasporas in Europe and North America in order to tap into their human capital in terms of expertise and experiences gained while abroad. A few measures taken in recent times include the establishment of a dedicated unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to look into diaspora matters\textsuperscript{34} as well as the newly established government office for asylum, the office National pour la Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (ONPRA)(UNHCR, 2009).

### 6.1 Brain drain/ skill flow

As a result of conflict-induced outward migration, Burundi has lost significant numbers of essential skilled manpower, hindering capacity building during the current transition period. The majority of highly-skilled Burundians are found in Europe and North America, which are the main top destination countries for Burundian migrants.\textsuperscript{35} This group is composed of doctors, nurses, scholars, teachers, and engineers whose flight has left a huge human capital dent in Burundi. Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands, especially the first generation migrants, were people in high positions in the civil service or students before leaving the country. Within this group there are highly skilled individuals such as doctors, nurses, teachers, and students at various levels, which shows the heavy loss and likely impact of brain drain in Burundi\textsuperscript{36}. In 2000 the rate of tertiary educated Burundi migrants was 19.9%, (Ratha and Xu, 2008), of which 6.5% are doctors and 77.9% nurses. Other estimates indicate that about 10,095 highly-skilled Burundians

\[\text{http://consensus.fsu.edu/academic_directory/2004casestudies/HaighWageRwandaCaseStudy.pdf}
\]
Accessed 1/12/1009

\textsuperscript{33} Interview with BWPD, and Stichting Tabarana, November 2009

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with BIA, October 2009, and Stichting Tabarana, November, 2009, (although there is still no documental proof of this imitative)


\textsuperscript{36} For a detailed analysis, see Lemarchand and Martin (1974)
live in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, which accounts for 38.6% of the entire highly-skilled workforce in Burundi (Spaan and Moppes, 2006). Others put the figures at 12,482 (Hugo, 2006). The discrepancies in these figures are due to lack of accurate data on the ground in Burundi but also the absence of precise official estimates in countries of residence, which fail to note the number of highly-skilled undocumented migrants. The prolongation of conflict in some parts of Burundi and continued mistrust between the various groups further fuels the flight of essential human capital despite that relative calm that has returned to the country.

In the academic field, poor working conditions have contributed significantly to the brain drain of academic staff. In addition to the impact of outward migration, internal displacement is also a major migratory dimension and pattern that disrupts the conditions necessary for the development of qualified manpower. The massive dislocation of Burundian families from villages to urban areas, region to region, and into the border regions has also disrupted local knowledge bases for essential human capital for subsistence production. It can be concluded that brain drain in Burundi will have negative growth effects (Rapoport, 2002), due to the migration rate of its highly educated as a result of conflict. It will also impact reconstruction efforts due to the absence of essential human capital in a small country like Burundi. This is a scenario captured by Docquier (2006), who observed that brain drain impacts a wide range of features such as human capital formation, the role of remittances, the impact of return migration, the effects of diaspora externalities, and governance and corruption. These are aspects that confront Burundi at a period of transition, when the absence of suitable institutional frameworks and appropriate migration and development policies for attracting the diaspora could hinder the realization of brain-gain efforts (Schiff, 2005).

6.2 Return migration
The return to relative peace after the Arusha Peace Accord has led to an increasing number of Burundians in the diaspora returning home temporarily, permanently, or as tourists to help with the reconstruction. This includes the return and reintegration of Burundian refugees coming from neighbouring countries and the internally displaced who are currently being assisted to settle in their previous villages and homes.

Due to the country’s recent return to relative calm, large numbers of Burundian refugees in the Great Lakes Region are returning home (IDMC, 2008; Lemarchand, 2006) (also see map below). About 500,000 Burundian refugees are estimated to have returned to Burundi from 2002 to mid-2009 (UNHCR 2009, p6). The return of Burundi diaspora seems to be the result of individual motivations instead of a government initiative. This is contrary to the view that “governments of countries emerging from conflict are now increasingly coming to appreciate the potential that refugee diasporas hold, particularly in terms of the remittances they can send” (Koser and Van Hear 2003, p15).

At the local level return programmes are being supported by the international community (UNHCR, 2009), but these programmes face obstacles largely linked to the absence of a national policy on internal displacement or specific interventions that promote return combined with local integration or resettlement (See IDMC, 2009). Some of these return efforts are based on individual as well as group initiatives such as those organised by Burundi Women for Peace and IZERE in the Netherlands. Different Dutch development agencies and government ministries often collaborate with relevant diaspora organisations and support group initiatives upon specific requests for funding or if in line with policy priorities and focus of these agencies.

Some Burundians in the diaspora in Europe and North America are beginning to return home as well, and this process is determined by several personal factors outside of the government policy and formal processes. A number of personal situations hinder the likelihood of return. There are people, for instance, who are currently engaged in various occupations in the destination countries, some with young families, others still studying, and some still caught in asylum processes. Among these different groups, return is most likely if sources of livelihood upon return are favourable. Those with steady jobs and good incomes are most likely to return only if guaranteed similar positions and incomes. In the case of the Netherlands and to a large extent Belgium, some Burundians are beginning to return if nominated for high positions in the current government. It has also been noted that only those who have Dutch nationality are likely to return to Burundi because they still have the possibility to come back to the Netherlands if the situation on the ground changes. The majority of the international returnees are not those resident in the Netherlands, however, but those who had lived in Belgium and North America.38

---

38 Interview November 26, 2009
6.3 Remittances

Given the relatively small size of the Burundian diaspora in Europe and North America, the volume of remittances is likely to be smaller compared to remittances sent by other African groups. According to Ratha and Xu (2008), remittances to Burundi accounted for 0.1% of GDP in 2006, but they caution that the true size of the remittance flow is believed to be much larger when including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels. Furthermore, total flows may not always equal the sum of the components, as they may be pieced together from a variety of alternative sources.

Information on the implications of remittances for recipients and development processes at large is likewise lacking. De Bryun and Wets make similar observations and note that “more information is needed about the importance of remittances for households in Burundi: Who receives remittances? Are the recipients mainly based in urban centres? Which proportion of revenues is derived from remittances?” De Bryun and Wets further argue that “without this kind of information, it is impossible to determine the development potential of remittances” (De Bryun and Wets, 2006, p50).

A few institutional estimates may give a better indication of remittance levels by capturing overall remittance estimates from Europe. The Central Bank of Burundi keeps records of international financial transfers received by residents in Burundi via the banking system. According to their 2003 data, about US$2.9 million was remitted to Burundi. In 2004 total remittances were estimated at about US$4.1 million (IOM, 2008, p36) while in 2005, IOM estimates suggest that some US$16 million was remitted to Burundi (IOM, 2009). Based on these estimates the Ministry of Finance’s calculations suggests that official remittance flows into the country represented about 0.48 % of the GNP in 2003 and 0.6 % of the GNP in 2004. In this case Burundi still needs to mobilize its diaspora in order to encourage remittances if it is to achieve remittance levels similar to those reported for other Africa countries.

The records are general and do not give details of the countries from which remittances originate, however. For this reason there are no official figures indicating which specific countries the money came from even though these figures can still be accessed through data of money transfer companies and the central bank. The situation applies to the estimates of remittance flows from the Netherlands to Burundi because

---

41 Although such information are always indicated in the transfer details
non-bank money operators predominantly send remittances from the Netherlands to Burundi (also see Black et al, 2004, p13). The inclusion of unrecorded remittances is therefore likely to increase the official estimated flow by a factor of 2.5 (Sander, 2003, p5). This is therefore an area that still requires further research.

6.3.1 Remittances from Burundians in the Netherlands

Compared to other African migrant communities in the Netherlands, Burundians are still a minority group at slightly above 3000 (CBS, 2009). The small population and the nature of the economic activities in which that population is engaged will significantly determine the volumes and frequency of remittances sent back to Burundi. As noted earlier the Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands is largely composed of political refugees, many of whom are highly skilled in various fields. These characteristics may further inform their ability to access the labour market or engage in self-employment.

The total amount of remittances sent from the Netherlands to Africa in 2004 was estimated to be more than €40 million (Mohogu, 2006). Country specific estimates are not available, however. Burundian diaspora groups and individuals interviewed at the time of drafting this paper, however, confirm regular transfers back to Burundi. Factors that influence remittances sent by Burundians include their sources of income, income levels, gender, family commitments (dependants in Burundi), level of education, immigration status, the presence of immediate family members in the Netherlands, and the duration of stay in the Netherlands. The amounts remitted vary markedly, however it has been noted that “people with low incomes remit proportionally more money to their families than people who are more highly educated and have higher incomes. People with higher income often send back money for investments and construction of houses or support to a political party.” (De Bryun and Wets 2006, p35). The amount of remittances sent ranges between €100 and €1000 a month, with a majority of Burundians in the Netherlands sending money home at least 6 times a year.

The channels used for sending remittances by Burundians in the Netherlands largely depend on how familiar the remitter is with the channel, trust, proximity to the service, reliability, and access to the service by receivers back home. Most Burundian diaspora send remittances home through informal channels. Informal channels include

---

43 Less educated and irregular migrants tend to send money home more frequently than other groups.
service providers and agents and are based on personal relationships; individuals who are returning for holidays and other missions commonly carry money to the destination. There are groups, however, that use formal channels such as account-to-account transfers via banks, cash-based transfers via MTOs (Sander, 2003), transfers utilising the SWIFT system (Carling, 2005), and electronic transfers (Isern et al., 2005). Primarily people with legal status who have bank accounts use these formal channels. Western Union and Money Gram are the main formal money transfer channels to Burundi. They have several branches and agencies across the country, and they are the preferred transfer channel choice by most Burundian diaspora. The choice for these two companies is due to advantages such as speed, security, and reliability, advantages that outweigh the high cost of sending money through this channel (De Bryun and Wets, 2006, pp37-9).

6.4 The impact of remittances in Burundi

Remittances are mainly used to meet basic subsistence needs of family members, relatives and close friends as well as for education and health care. Remittances are also used for the construction of houses and purchase of property in preparation for return or as an investment (de Bryun and Wets 2006, p35). Some diaspora also remit to help families left behind in camps in Tanzania, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to pay for food, shelter, education and healthcare as well as to set up small businesses. Other uses include family events, such as marriages, funerals, and baptisms. Burundians in the Netherlands also contribute money to collective remittances, which are used for projects in their home country. These resources mainly target people outside the family and include a range of uses from funding of community projects to emergency funds in crisis situations. (Burundi Women for Peace and Development, 2009) Political parties also benefit from remittances, both from their members in the diaspora and from people in the diaspora seeking to have political influence at home.44

Remittances constitute an important source of income, and thus livelihoods, in Burundi even though access to international remittances might not apply equally to all groups and regions. For the poor communities or marginalised groups such as the Twa or internally displaced who did not get the chance to flee to Europe and North America, the benefits of international remittances are unlikely to reach their regions. In the context of the recent economic crisis it is not clear how global events will impact remittances to Burundi, but forecasts suggest that overall remittance flows will remain stable despite the

44 Interview November 13, 2009 Almere
global economic crisis (ADB, 2009). This forecast is based on the assumption that informal remittances follow similar trends as formal remittances, and formal remittances are sometimes considered only a minor share of total remittances (ADB, 2009). It has been observed, for instance, that unilateral private transfers have surged since 2005, increasing by an average of 80% per year between 2005 and 2008 (ADB, 2009). This surge is probably a result of the improved security situation following the 2005 elections. The pace of increase, measured monthly as the rolling year-on-year rate of growth, peaked in December 2007 and then decreased steadily to stabilize around 20% in October 2008 (ADB, 2009, pp6-19).

These assumptions confirm the perceptions within the Burundian community in the Netherlands that remittances will still continue to flow despite the economic crisis. The current struggles within families left back home or those returning from camps in Tanzania and other places put a lot of pressure on family member living in the diaspora. With the peace process on track and the country gearing up for the 2010 elections, more monetary support is likely to flow both for families and political players as the diaspora prepares to influence outcomes that could guarantee their safe return and comfortable life.

6.5 International programmes for migration and development

The Burundian government through the Ministry of Public Administration, Labour, and Social Security has been working in collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration through the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) project under the Great Lakes programme (IOM, 2005). The aim of this programme is to make use of the competencies of the Burundian diaspora in Europe to fill human resources gaps in the country’s institutions (IOM, 2005). The main sectors the programme focuses on will help bolster economic and social development; health, education, and rural development have been of particular interest, with the programmes mainly aimed at facilitating and supporting the exchange of knowledge and resources through (1) the transfer of skills by means of repeated short-term and medium-term missions, (2) the development of distance and e-learning courses, and (3) the long-term use of remittances to enhance development in the region (IOM, 2005). Other programmes include partnerships with international development agencies such as BINUB, FAO, ICRC, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO and the World Bank, whose partnership

45 For details on MIDA programme, see http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/ mida-africa/
and engagement is intended to bridge the gap between assistance to returnees and broader development efforts and aims to improve the socio-economic conditions in areas of return (UNHCR 2009, p11).

The MIDA programme, especially the one being implemented in the Netherlands for Burundi, is criticized for being too selective and for engaging in less consultation with targeted communities and diaspora organizations. The Burundi diaspora organization IZERE, for example, often organizes activities every year and invites MIDA officials to hear their ideas and suggestion on how the return of Burundian professionals to help with reconstruction and other areas of need can be facilitated.46 This invitation is informed by the belief that many Burundians in the Netherlands could benefit much more through MIDA, but due to the ineffectiveness of the programme and fear regarding the motives of the programme, many migrants are reluctant to participate.

The lack of consultation, feelings of uncertainty, and image upon return are cited as some of the major obstacles to success of MIDA. Many Burundians in the Netherlands have numerous problems ranging from psychological conditions, financial and economic dependency among family and relatives back home, lack of employment, and long durations stuck in the asylum procedure. Many cite depression due to lack of employment caused by little knowledge of the language, and a relatively small number of Burundians in the Netherlands can access support networks to help them overcome other serious problems that hinder their participation in Dutch society. The emotional problems associated with lack of opportunities makes it difficult to consider returning home, especially when they feel they have nothing to take along in terms of investment or work experience.47

On the ground in Burundi, the UNHCR works in close collaboration with the national authorities, its implementing partners and donors, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), and UN sister agencies. The main governmental counterparts are the Ministry of the Interior and Communal Development and the Ministry of National Solidarity, Repatriation, National Reconstruction, Human Rights and Gender. The Office works closely with a number of special government agencies such as the Commission Nationale des Terres et Autres Biens. The UNHCR will continue to play a key role in the Integrated Commission for Repatriation and

46 Interview October 5, and November 10, 2009
47 Interview November 26, 2009
Reintegration, which brings together key ministries, UN agencies, and donor representatives in order to define common approaches. (UNHCR, 2009)

Other national-level programmes also exist in the Netherlands to facilitate either the integration or return of migrants. One example is the Netherlands Migration Institute (NMI). The institute is mainly funded by the Dutch government and is dedicated to working on the orientation and preparation of voluntary reintegration of individual migrants and refugees. The NMI provides practical information, counselling, and supervision to any person or group that has to make a choice between staying in the Netherlands or returning to their countries of origin. The NMI also helps refugees, people who wish to return to their country of origin, and those who want to migrate to another country.
7. Policies Regarding Migration

Migration and development is currently at the top of international policy and academic debates as well as political agendas of governments, regional, and international institutions. With more than 5 million people crossing international borders to live in a developed country every year (HDR, 2009, p9), both developing and developed countries alike are recognising the implications of global migration in its various forms, and as such they are developing mechanisms to address the challenges such migration brings along. Governments are therefore trying to identify solutions to the negative impact of brain drain through enhanced cooperation and inter-state consultations (Solomon, 2005) on issues related to migration and mobility. Measures being taken by developing countries include the development of national policies for managing migration as well as policies to attract the diaspora as a group that is increasingly being seen as agents of development (Aquinas, 2009). Others are developing strategies and mechanisms to facilitate formal engagement with their diaspora. In this context several institutions are being created at different levels of government that exhibit diverse priorities and degrees of organisation (Aquinas, 2009).

7.1 Migration policies in Burundi

In the case of Burundi, measures being taken by the government are not yet well established. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in favour of engaging the diaspora for development in Burundi, but not much action has been taken in terms of policy suggestions, creation of migration units or departments to address migration and development related issues, and the development of a substantial relationship with the Burundian diaspora. Aside from the MIDA programme and other internationally-supported programmes for the internally displaced and the National Asylum Office, the Burundian government does not yet have any major policy on migration and development.

7.2 Burundian government’s policies towards the diaspora

As noted earlier the Burundian government does not have any comprehensive policy document on migration and development. This also applies to matters related to the diaspora: even though there is informal recognition and engagement with the diaspora in different destination countries, no uniform government policy has arisen. Informal recognition of the diaspora was evident for instance in March 2007, when Burundian
parliamentarians held a conference under the auspices of the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) to encourage the Burundi diaspora to participate in the development of their country. The conference, which took place in Brussels, saw representation from Burundians from France, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The conference created a Joint Committee made up of representatives of the Burundian government and 10 experts from the diaspora to set up a coherent project on how Burundians in the diaspora can contribute to the development of the country (BWPD, 2009).

Despite these gestures there is no comprehensive policy, and no attempts to create appropriate institutions either at ministerial or departmental levels to address issues of migration have been made. In response to this state of affairs, individual members of the Burundi diaspora through their organizations in Europe are planning to hold a conference in October 2010 in Belgium in readiness for the election in August 2010 (BWPD, 2009). Their aim is to develop a strong diaspora platform that can enable them to influence policy at home and make their voices heard. They point out the many efforts being put forward by the Burundian diaspora, especially among major groups in the Netherlands, in the reconstruction process, but the government in Burundi seems not to recognize such efforts (BWPD, 2009).

7.3 The EU migration policies - implications for Burundi
The EU policy towards developing countries similarly applies to Burundi in terms of migration. This is captured in the overall EU migration policy, especially in the external dimension of the migration policy that was officially embraced at the 1999 Tampere European Council. At this meeting the EU Heads of State and Government declared that the EU “needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries of origin and transit. Partnerships with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with the view to promote co-development.” (EU SEC 2009, 1240 final).

In the context of a widening global agenda for development policy, the EU has developed in recent years an ambitious programme, called the Global Approach, to address the external dimensions of its migration policy as well as to increase Policy

---

Coherence for Development (PCD) in the migration area. In this way the EU is also acting on its commitments undertaken in the 2005 EU Consensus on Development by including migration issues in the political dialogue, mainstreaming migration into development cooperation, and creating synergies between migration and development policy. The EU policy in this context has ramifications for Burundi, especially in the area of the Blue Card Policy and focus on initiatives such as return or circular migration\(^{50}\) to address the problems of brain drain in the developing countries.

Without its own national policies and programmes, Burundi is likely to face major challenges in terms of dealing with migration issues. Worse still, it will miss out on the global and regional partnerships through which international processes and policies such as the EU’s Global Approach are implemented. Furthermore, the development and implementation of the EU migration policy cut across a number of administrative areas at national and EU-level including at the interior, justice, economics, and foreign affairs levels. It is also regulated under very different legal frameworks at national and EU level. These frameworks will directly impact Burundians living in different EU countries in terms of entry and mobility. Other initiatives and policies that can impact Burundi are the EU’s Directive on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally-Staying Third Country Nationals (‘Return Directive’)\(^{51}\), the EU’s support for the establishment of an African Remittances Institute, facilitation of EU-wide Diaspora networks, and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

Burundi is also covered by the partnership dialogue between the EU and the AU under the Joint African EU Strategy (JAES)\(^{52}\) in addition to already-existing frameworks for dialogue such as articles 8 and 13 of the Cotonou Agreement.\(^{53}\) These are dialogue processes that will also impact migration and development issues within Burundi due to their regional coverage and likely impact through implementation in countries that neighbour Burundi.

---

\(^{50}\) The EU defines circular migration as ‘a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries’


\(^{52}\) The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) is an overarching policy framework between the AU and the EU with the aim of establishing a “political partnership” between two Unions and to support the pan-African integration process, amongst others through the consolidation of the African architecture at continental level.

\(^{53}\) The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, concluded in 2000 and revised in 2005,\(^{53}\) is part of a longstanding development cooperation relationship between the European Union and countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, collectively known as the ACP Group (For details see DPIR, _ECDPM reports available at www.ecdpm.org)
8. Migration Relationship with the Netherlands

As governments seek ways to manage migration while maximising its benefits and reducing its negative impacts, consultations on approaches to migration and development are taking place at regional levels but also within the various bilateral relations and agreements. This is most significant for countries that are linked by migration. Migration is also gaining prominence in the debate about global security (Sommer and Warnecke, 2008; Huysmans, 2006; Faist, 2004) in relation to illegal forms of migration and security threats posed by unmanaged global mobility. In this context receiving countries are faced with challenges of how to protect their borders while at the same time following international instruments for dealing with migration and refugees in ways that are acceptable within contemporary global norms of human rights.

8.1 General Burundian relationship with the Netherlands

The Netherlands is one of the primary destination countries in Europe beside Belgium, France, and Switzerland for Burundians. Settlement in the Netherlands is, however, determined by the relocation requests and programmes by UNHCR as well as the Dutch policy on asylum, especially for groups that are persecuted, which favoured Burundian asylum seekers during the conflict period between 1993 and 2003.

The Burundian diaspora is a new diaspora group in the Netherlands compared to other groups from West Africa and the Horn of Africa. In comparison to Belgium, Burundians in the Netherlands have difficulties with the language, and at governmental level the Dutch state feels less responsible for Burundi than the Belgian government does. In Belgium the Burundian diaspora are much freer, and the language and historical connections make it easy for most of them to access jobs and integrate easily, a factor that improves their living conditions and determine their ability to contribute more proactively to ongoing processes in Burundi.

Most Burundian diaspora organizations concur that they do engage with the Dutch government and development agencies from time to time and depending on policy issues and prorates. They also observe, however, that invitations to engage are selective and that consultation is not open. In this regard they argue that discussions on certain matters affecting the Netherlands and Burundi are often undertaken in public forums or seminars without their knowledge. Even though they receive financial support for a number of projects, they feel that much more consultation and

---

54 Interview November, 2009
collaboration between the Burundian diaspora and the Dutch government could enhance their ability to contribute to development in Burundi as well as their ability to address various issues that affect their communities in the Netherlands. These observations reflect the nature of state-diaspora relations, which also raises the question of legitimacy and representativeness in the diaspora organisations. While their contributions could be valuable, the question is to what extent and upon what issues the host country government should consult diaspora organizations. This further raises concerns about what the right criteria would be for selection of diaspora organizations vis-à-vis groups and individual interests. These are questions that many diaspora groups are also asking, and this highlights the need for more dialogue and mechanisms to establish effective consolation processes to improve state-diaspora relations.

8.2 Dutch policy towards Burundi
The Dutch government is working with Burundi within its policy focus area of security and development (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). Burundi is viewed as a developing country with significant and pressing security problems or sharp divisions in society that is unlikely to achieve the millennium development goals. The Dutch government therefore focuses on policy efforts that would facilitate the right conditions to bring Burundi and countries in similar situations closer to achieving the millennium development goals. For this reason it focuses on such issues as basic service delivery that would guarantee people’s security and enhance the legitimacy and capacity of the government and its institutions (MFA). The Dutch government therefore considers the long-term process of consolidation of peace and stability in the country as a central part of its policy on Burundi.

In terms of official development aid (ODA), the Dutch government has made US$100.1 million available to Burundi as net ODA disbursement between 1996 and 2005. In 2005 the Netherlands was among the top donors to Burundi with US$22.9 million in ODA (OECD DAC Statistics, 2007). From 2003 the Dutch government has supported the peace process in Burundi between the CNDD-FDD and FNL but also during the 2005 elections through the UNDP. In 2007 alone the Dutch government spent €10,530,000 on regional stability and crisis management and €1,348,000 on issues concerning the business climate in developing countries (MFA, 2009). In general the

---

55 Interview November, 2009
56
Dutch government is focused on implementing the above policy together with the EU and other international partners. Following the recent peace process and reconstruction efforts in Burundi, the Dutch policy focuses on three major areas: peace and security, governance, and socioeconomic development. Through these broad themes the government aims to support Burundi in:

1. Improving peace and security; achieving lasting political peace and security sector reform.
2. Improving governance: contributing towards running or recurring government expenditure (such as teachers’ and healthcare workers’ salaries) and paying for a technical expert to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Finance.
3. Socioeconomic development: supporting the development of the Burundian economy through private sector investment, financial sector development, and improved access to financial services. (MFA, 2009)

8.3 An overview of Immigration and Refugee Legislation
In the 1990s a change occurred in Dutch policies regarding the relationship between integration and citizenship. From that point on immigrants were expected to demonstrate their commitment to the host country as a precondition to obtaining rights such as entry, permanent residence, and citizenship. Immigration and integration are issues that have traditionally been separated in the Netherlands. The Dutch policy response to the issue of migration has predominantly been restrictive since 1974 (ter Wal, 2005). The subsequent waves of migrants were considered as unwelcome anomalies requiring short-term and restrictive policy responses (Doomernik, 2001). This has recently changed with the establishment of a special department of Immigration and Integration (IND), which operates within the Ministry of Justice.

Between 2002 and 2006 the government further changed its policy framework by introducing mandatory integration requirements aimed at enhancing social cohesion through new restrictions on migration into the Netherlands. In 2006, for instance, the Dutch government introduced a selective migration policy (Ministry of Justice, 2006) based on the premise that any policy should address the needs of Dutch society and the labour market. The new policy was therefore aimed at taking full advantage of the possibilities offered by migration (Ministry of Justice, June 2006). Since January 2009 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) has implemented a new migration system. Through this policy a new admission scheme for highly-educated persons was introduced.
whereby highly-educated foreign nationals who have at least attained a master of arts degree can obtain a residence permit with a maximum term of one year in order to find a job in the Netherlands.

In general the Dutch policy on asylum cases, especially for groups affected by conflict, has enabled many Burundians to acquire temporary and long-term stay permits, and an increasing number have become naturalised citizens. The policy shift between 2002 and 2006 granted many Burundian migrants access to various opportunity structures that enabled them to settle and to establish groups that cater to their welfare needs and developmental input back in Burundi.

8.4 The Dutch migration policies and legislation: implications for Burundian migrants

There are several pieces of legislation dealing with migration and refugees in the Netherlands. These include the Netherlands Nationality Act (Rijkswet op het Nederlandschap) and the Dutch Aliens Act of 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), which form the statutory basis for forced and independent departure (Ministerie van Justitie, 2007). This policy will have serious implications for Burundians seeking asylum or for those whose asylum requests have been rejected. With the return of relative peace to Burundi, the position held on Burundian asylum applications is likely to change and make it more difficult to be granted asylum in the Netherlands. Due to a lack of institutional capacity, the implementation of this law is also likely to be problematic within Burundi: the government will be challenged to receive returnees and ensure that returnees do not attempt re-emigration. The other legislation that is likely to impact Burundian migrants is the 1985 naturalisation law, which allowed children born in Dutch territory to acquire citizenship (Jacobs, 1998). According to this law dual nationality is not accepted, and naturalisation means renouncing one’s previous nationality. As result many Burundians who have acquired Dutch citizenship face difficulties in complying with the directive as well as the treatment they expect from the Burundian government if dual citizenship is not allowed.

Another legislation that is likely to impact many Burundian migrants is the Civic Integration Act, which came into effect on 1 January, 2007. This law stipulates that all foreign nationals in the Netherlands pass the civic integration examination (Dutch National Contact Point for the European Migration Network, 2007). The overseas integration test only applies to nationals of selected countries wishing to join family members or spouses in the Netherlands (van Heelsum, 2006), and Burundians who wish
to bring their spouse, children or family left behind during the long asylum process are likely to face additional hurdles to family reunion. The problem is further compounded by the language difficulties, as most Burundians are French speakers and might not have access Dutch lessons in their country of origin.

In recent years the Dutch government has begun a pilot programme for the Assisted Return of Rejected Asylum Seekers with a number of other countries, including Burundi. The impacts of the current policy shift, which focuses on return migration, is yet to be established, however, especially with regards to such programmes as MIDA. At the beginning of the 1990s the attitude toward migrant organisations changed (Penninx and van Heelsum, 2004), and a general policy shift began to emphasize integration into the social economic field. This shift was based on the assumption that too much emphasis on cultural and religious identity might hinder socio-economic integration (also see Miles, 1993; van Heelsum 2006, p4; Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 1990). Even though they are considered latecomers among African migrants in the Netherlands, the establishment of Burundi diaspora organisations in the late 1990s gained impetus toward the end of the 1980s through Dutch policies that aimed at achieving full and equal participation of migrant groups within society, granting them space for cultural expression and development facilitated by the government (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
9. Future Perspectives on Burundian Migration

One of the most pressing challenges Burundi faces today is the return of refugees and IDPs: “How to accommodate their demands for land, emergency aid and jobs in a context of severe economic scarcity is a crucial challenge facing the government” (Lemarchand, 2006, p.1). Especially in a country that has been torn by violent conflict such as Burundi, repatriation and integration processes into the home country might be problematic due to a lack of socio-economic infrastructure (UNHCR, 2009b). One of the basic necessities for this process to succeed is a good and transparent political system in combination with active participation of international donors (Lemarchand, 2006; UNHCR, 2009b). As long as the root causes of conflict in Burundi are not fully understood and addressed, however, the vicious cycle of conflict and refugee flows will continue (Hovil, 2008).

The UNHCR (2009a) states that the current political and humanitarian situation in Burundi is still unstable. The country is characterized by high poverty levels, increasing crime levels, rising food prices, and rising prices for other commodities. Despite a peace-agreement between the Burundian government and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL, there are still reports of violence and human rights violations in the country. This, in combination with a rising youth population and simultaneously-growing unemployment levels (World Bank, 2009b), is a risk factor for future conflict and refugee problems in the country and the Central African Great Lakes Region as a whole. In addition, due to its high annual population growth (UN, 2008), land scarcity is an issue on its own, providing a breeding ground for dispute in an already densely populated country. The demographic changes mentioned above might also lead to an increasing trend of highly-skilled emigration from Burundi, the so-called ‘brain drain’. This is a trend characteristic for other African developing countries facing the same demographic challenges as Burundi such as Ethiopia.

In the context of regional integration and in line with global initiatives for management of migration, Burundi will still face major challenges in terms of adequate policy instruments that fit into international frameworks. This would require institutional restructuring and reorganization in which relevant units are established with a mandate to focus on migration and development as well as to implement the necessary programmes within the country and jointly with development partners. Such institutional and policy re-orientation would entail adoption of policy coherence measures among relevant ministries and departments working on migration. Furthermore if Burundi is to
maximize on the positives and minimize the negatives of migration on development, the state will need to recognize migration realities to tap into the developmental potentials that lie in its diaspora. Any initiative in the area of migration and development will have to address the current pressing issues of internal displacement, resettlement of returning refugees, and the successful implementation of the peace agreement as pre-conditions for maximization of the positive dimensions of migration.

Table 13: Net Migration rates Burundi: 2000-2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net migration rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-2020</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020-2025</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025-2030</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030-2035</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2035-2040</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2040-2045</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2045-2050</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN, 2008. Note: Migration rates are per 1,000 of the population.
10. Conclusion

Diaspora
The Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands operate at a level in which they interact and communicate through social networks that are likely to lead to isolation, especially due to the language barrier and lack of access to the labour market for the highly skilled. These factors hinder their full participation in Dutch society. Use of opportunity structures available within the Dutch political system has enabled Burundian diaspora organisations to mobilize through formal structures and participate in development programmes in their country of origin. The system has also facilitated their network building and the formation of mutual support structures. This is evident in the many groups that are being formally organized in order to maximize on the full range of their capabilities as they focus on various migration and development issues in the country of origin and residence. Burundian diaspora in the Netherlands are beginning to recognize that their formidable strength lies in working together with fellow diasporas and migrants on national, regional, and global levels. This is evident in the initiatives that target the EU-wide Burundian community as well as the intensification of engagement with the reconciliation, reconstruction, and democratization processes at home.

Migration Policies
Although the Dutch Government already recognizes the potential role of migrant organizations in the Netherlands, it could still support the creation of a more enabling environment in which diasporas and migrant communities can actualize their aspirations to become more politically and socially mobile. Such an environment would have significant implications for development of their communities of origin in Burundi as well as communities in which they live in the Netherlands. This is more so the case for members of the Burundian community who still have to deal with traumatic experiences during the war, their inability to access the labour market in the Netherlands, and the lack of support networks due to the limited numbers of Burundians in the Netherlands.

The Burundi government on the other hand seems to recognize the role of their diaspora, but due to the absence of formal structures for engagement with the diaspora and a comprehensive migration and development policy, endeavours to attract the highly skilled Burundians would not yield much result. Furthermore lack of national instruments to address migration and development issues would hinder efforts that involve the international community as many countries begin to establish links to global
efforts aimed at addressing the various dimensions of global mobility. Having appropriate migration policies and intuitional frameworks would have a significant impact on the current reconstruction and democratization processes, which requires more input from development partners as well as Burundians abroad. Moreover, because many Burundians in the Netherlands are largely political refugees, addressing the push factors linked to local politics within the framework of the on-going reconciliation process could go a long way in facilitating the return of the highly skilled and experienced Burundians who are not using those skills in the diaspora.

**Return migration**

In the case of Burundi, return migration is a complex and sensitive issue, especially among individuals who displaced and had their land taken by those who remained. Claims to family land and property in the post-conflict period poses great challenges, which confront both would-be returnees in Europe and those from nearby camps in the region. Some of these problems are connected to the history of marginalization and land expropriation that dates back to the 1972, when Hutu refugees were systematically deprived of their goods and lands in the fertile Imbo plain by the Micombero and Bagaza regimes (International Crisis Group, 2003). Such problems are bound to arise, especially in places where displaced Tutsis currently eke out a living on the edges of the cities and victims of profiteers who benefited from the absence or death of the legal owners either to seize land or to sell it at a profit barely survive (International Crisis Group, 2003). Burundians in the diaspora are faced with these realities, but many face the more important decision to return with empty hands. While some have been working as professionals, those who have been on welfare or minimal support from the host country government might not have means to acquire new property. If they have been in the asylum process for over five years, their ability to integrate in the labour market might be hampered by lack of experience in comparison to those who remained behind. Personal reasons and other factors such as incentives offered through current return or circular migration programmes therefore play a significant role as to whether Burundian diaspora are likely to participate in the return programs.
References


Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) (Statistics Netherlands) (2009). Allochtonen


66


Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. Working Papers Migration and Development Series, No. 4. Research Group Migration and Development, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.


Appendix I. Burundi Diaspora organization in the Netherlands

**Burundi in Action (BIA)**

BIA stand for (Burundi in Action) which is a young and dynamic association created by Burundian professionals living and working in the Netherlands. Its mission is to find and plan strategic key action through which Burundian professionals in the Netherlands can develop their undercapitalised wealth of knowledge and experience between Burundian Diaspora. It aims to mobilized and bring together Burundian professional living in the Netherlands during a seminar of two day to discuss and meet each other.

The main objectives are:
- Engage professional Burundian in the Netherlands as strategic agents for development in Burundi.
- Create a database of highly skill Burundian professional among Burundian diaspora.
- Explore new ways through which we can work with Dutch and international organisation to develop the country.
- Enhance network building to promote and marketing our untapped potentials.
- Establish a new dialogue between Burundian professional and Dutch and international organisation.
- Harness diaspora potential and aiming their expertise from their professional background to brainstorm new and creative idea to impact our community.

Contact:
Eric Mbonimpa Vice president
Tel: 0681 314 752
E-mail: rikmbo@hotmail.com

**IZERE**

IZERE is non-profit organization without any political or commercial goals.

**Goals**
- To provide a meeting point for Burundians, and an opportunity for dialogue.
- To make the voice of Burundians in Burundi heard, and talk about the problems the country faces.
- To help Burundians that still face prosecution, torture, and poverty, by any means possible.

“Culture is the best ambassador of Burundi” Culture has always played a crucial role in the life on Burundians (religion, family life, child-raising practices, oral history, political influence of culture). Information provision was one of the main reasons to start IZERE. We want the audience to inform about the exact image of our country and the current Burundian problems in general, by referring to the history of Burundi. Anyone can become a member, whether you are Burundian or not, and regardless your political view or ethnicity.

Contact
Trasmolenstraat 22
1333 CX Almere
Tel./ Fax: (036) 540 72 90
E-mail: A.Nkeshimana@12move.nl
Website: http://home.planet.nl/~nkesh000/
**Nederland Comite Burundi (Stitching)**

The NCB is a foundation, which was set up to contribute to peace in Burundi, and to promote Burundi in the Netherlands. The NCB was set up after 1993, when the civil war took place in Burundi. Now, the country has a democratic elected government, but the peace process is fragile. Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world, and international help for reconstruction is important. The NCB attempts to contribute to this process. The NCB organizes projects in Burundi that contribute to dialogue and awareness. Since 2006, the foundation also organizes sustainable reconstruction activities. The NCB is free of any religious, political or other view. The NCB is neutral with respect to all conflicts that currently take place in the country.

The goals of the NCB are twofold:

- Contribute to peace, conflict prevention, conflict control, reconciliation and economic development in Burundi
- Provide information about Burundi and its people to Dutch citizens.

Contact:
Maartenshof 1  
2311 RL Leiden  
Telefoonnummer: 026-3707961  
Fax: 026-3707961  
E-mail: info@Burundi-NCB.nl  
Website: [http://www.burundi-ncb.nl](http://www.burundi-ncb.nl/)

**Help Burundi (Stitching)**

Help Burundi is a foundation, which organizes projects that help people in Burundi to become self-sufficient and develop their personal skills so that they can improve their living conditions. The goal is to provide concrete development aid for people in Burundi, by means of an effective and non-nonsense organization. To finance the projects, Help Burundi relies on individual donations and human capital.

Contact:
Stichting "Help Burundi"  
Tel: 0541-296310  
Tele: 0541-291781  
Post address:  
Postbus 90  
7630 AB Ootmarsum  
E-Mail: info@helpburundi.nl  
Website: [http://www.helpburundi.nl](http://www.helpburundi.nl/)

**Burundian Woman for Peace and Development**

The BWPD helps Burundian women and youth develop in both Burundi and the Netherlands. It is a foundation, set up in the Netherlands in 2001. Women are underrepresented in government positions and organizations. The traditional role of women as a peace-contributing group is often ignored. BWPD wants to enhance recognition of women and self-development of the youth to overcome the crisis in Burundi. Education and training for women should be improved. Communication should be enhanced, and women should talk about their experiences. Also, women should be integrated into the Dutch society to make a difference.

The goals of BWPD are:

- Integration of women in the Netherlands
- Participate in the peace process in Burundi
- Encourage the international community to help Burundi
- To actively participate in reconstruction processes in Burundi
- To increase and strengthen the role of Burundian women

Projects in Burundi:
- Secondary schools
- Training of teachers
- Multifunctional centre
- Own income

Projects in the Netherlands:
- Integration and welfare
- Capacity building

Contact
E-mail: bwpdnl@yahoo.fr
Website: http://www.burundesevrouwenvoorvrede.nl/

Central Africa Integrated Development and Education (SCAIDE), Foundation
SCAIDE was set up in 2005 as a foundation. SCAIDE wants to contribute to an integrated development of Central African countries. The goals and target group: SCAIDE wants to contribute to the integrated development of Central African countries such as Burundi, Rwanda and Congo. These countries share a history and current social and economic problems. SCAIDE also wants to help migrants from those countries that live in the Netherlands. SCAIDE wants to help them integrate, by means of:
- Computer training to help migrants find a job
- Talking about experiences
- Organizing workshops
- Internet training to help with practical issues such as housing, employment, etc.

Contacts:
Ankrot 53
7523LJ Enschede
Tel: 053-4306103
E-mail: fondationscaide@yahoo.com
Website: www.scaide1.org

IKIBIRI

Ikibiri was set up in 2000. The original goal was to contribute to integration of Burundians in the Netherlands. Within two years this goal was adjusted. ABOUT:
University study for members of the community. More than ten years experience in the Dutch society. KEY ACTIVITIES: Diaspora and development. PUBLICATIONS: Knowledge with Burundian social, culture and political policy. Now, IKIBIRI organizes development projects in Burundi. It mainly focuses on education, good governance and improvements of the economic infrastructure.

Contacts:
Tsjalk 109 Barendrecht
0180-610786
Tel: 071 8882141 - 062 4440542
E-mail: dirambona@yahoo.fr
SO KCA
ABOUT: Socka aims to deliver structural support from the Netherlands to projects that support children living in Central Africa. Education is their main target.
KEY ACTIVITIES: Sokca supports projects in several countries in Central Africa, particularly education projects and activities such as schools building. Target group: refugee children, poor children, children that have no home, handicapped children, orphans, and children that were affected by HIV/AIDS.

Contacts:
Tel: 031-5325112
E-mail: info@sokca.com
Website: www.sokca.com/

Stichting Reragakura
Reragarakura is a foundation set up in 2002 by Burundian refugees in the Netherlands. The goal of the organization is to contribute to development in Burundi. Currently, the foundation attempts to help 60 orphan children to meet their primary needs. Reragakura focuses on small-scale development projects in Burundi, especially poverty reduction projects, healthcare, education and peace-education projects. Hereby, the foundation attempts to contribute to reconstruction in Burundi. Reragakura also wants to play an active role in mobilizing the diaspora for sustainable peace and development in Burundi.

Contacts
Postbus 3045
3202 GA Utrecht
Acaciaplein 95
2803 WE Gouda

Stichting Muyinga
Stichting Consulatieburo's Muyinga Burundi is een stichting die zich bezighoudt met inzamelen van geld voor het gehandicaptencentrum in Muyinga, Burundi.
Zuigelings In 1983 bezocht mevrouw Jo Klaver voor het eerst de missiepost in Muyinga om op bezoek te gaan bij haar tante. Daar werd Jo getroffen door de erbarmelijk e toestand van de zuigelings. Terug in Nederland riep Jo een stichting in het leven met als doel het verwezenlijk en van consultatieburo's.

Contact:
St. Consultatieburo's Muyinga Burundi
Blauwe Torenstraat 3-7
7241 BD LOCHEM
Tel. 0573 - 25 11 96
E-mail: oklaver@muyinga.nl
Website: www.burundi.nl/ muyinga.html
### Appendix II Commonly used terms for Refugees

**Refugees** include individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or, those enjoying “temporary protection.” The refugee population includes people in a refugee-like situation.

**Asylum-seekers** are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined. Those covered in this report refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2008, irrespective of when they may have been lodged.

**Internally displaced persons** are people or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural- or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border. For purposes of UNHCR’s statistics, this population only includes conflict-generated IDPs to whom the Office extends protection and/or assistance. The IDP population includes people in an IDP-like situation.

**Returned refugees (returnees)** refer to refugees who have returned voluntarily to their country of origin or habitual residence. For purposes of this report, only refugees who returned between January and December 2008 are included. However, in practice, operations may assist returnees for longer periods.

**Returned IDPs** refer to those IDPs who were beneficiaries of UNHCR’s protection and assistance activities and who returned to their areas of origin or habitual residence between January and December 2008. However, in practice, operations may assist IDP returnees for longer periods.

Source: UNHCR, 2007

---