

UNICEF TAJIKISTAN  
AND  
GOVERNMENT OF TAJIKISTAN - NATIONAL COMMISSION OF CHILD RIGHTS

# COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CHILD PROTECTION POLICIES IN TAJKISTAN

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Maastricht Graduate School of Governance  
Maastricht University

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
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to identify the best policy option for child protection in Tajikistan and to discuss the financial implications of a policy reform. In particular, it is of interest to address the fiscal space that would be needed to move from a traditional child protection system that is based on institutional care to a modern system characterized by community-based programs and by the permanence of children in well-functioning families.

We compare cost and benefit indicators in four scenarios: the scenario with no reform; and scenarios with low, moderate and high de-institutionalization of children<sup>1</sup>. For all scenarios applies that there will always be a need for institutions for children with very special needs. The presented policy options do not suggest closing all institutions. Costs included in the analysis refer to capital (for example, infrastructure) and recurrent costs such as staff salaries, utilities, and food. The cost indicators are the total cost, the cost per child and the child marginal cost, in each policy scenario; the main benefit indicator is the increase of productivity of children when they grow-up, which would result from the improvement of their environment during childhood if the system moves towards de-institutionalization. We discuss other non-measurable benefits that are related to long-term increments in productivity, such as the improvement of children's mental and physical health, and the improvement of their nutritional status that results from moving from a closed institution to a well-functioning family.



In this study, we assert based on the research literature, that a well-functioning family provides a better environment for the development of a child than residential care. We also show that policy options that are based on the de-institutionalization of children are less costly in the medium and long terms than the

current child protection system. Furthermore, we argue that the fiscal space that would be needed to finance a policy reform towards de-institutionalization of children would be made available by closing care institutions.

However, prior to implementing a policy of reducing the number of institutions and the children living in the institutions, quality alternative services for children and their families need to be in place. If de-institutionalization is done without the respective services available, it can cause more harm to children that are placed back into families or that are prevented from entering into institutions due to effective gate-keeping mechanisms.

<sup>1</sup> In the scenarios of low, moderate and high de-institutionalization, the speed of implementation of alternative child protection programs and the level of the guardianship allowance varies.

The current policy is more costly than any of the alternative policies in the long term because of the comparatively high operation costs of closed institutions. In this respect, we find that in the scenario of high de-institutionalization the alternative policy would cost less than half of the cost of the current policy by year 2018. In the scenario of low de-institutionalization, the alternative policy is still 15 per cent less costly than the current system by the same year in the long run (see figure).

#### Fiscal space created by implementing an alternative child protection system (thousand TS)

YEAR	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>MODERATE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (THOUSAND TS)	-495	2036	5991	12103	21506	35614	56771	89197	140196	230438
YEAR	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>HIGH DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (THOUSAND TS)	-535	3465	9493	18609	32290	52364	81983	126569	195541	315654
YEAR	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>LOW DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (THOUSAND TS)	-609	204	1570	3617	6903	12076	19710	32052	52882	93846

In the long term, fiscal space would be available after financing the implementation of the alternative programs and institutions. This fiscal space would give flexibility to the policy-making process and its efficient allocation would enhance the successful implementation of the new system. The resources released from the traditional institutions closed every year would be enough to finance training programs for social workers, increments of the guardianship allowance or strengthening of the PMPC, CRD and JJAP (see table below). Given the assumptions of the analysis, the reform scenarios are more effective in several respect compared to the current situation: the number of children living in institutions will decrease over time, and public resources will be spent more efficiently. Even taking into account the need for considerable investments in the short-run, reform expenses will pay off over a period of 10 years. This takes into account new institutional structures and the need for qualified staff that cannot be retrieved from other administrative organizations. Eventually, the costs of the proposed child protection system will be lower than continuing on the basis of the current system.

From this analysis, we conclude that the following conditions are necessary for a successful reform of the child protection system in Tajikistan:

- The process of de-institutionalization of children should be conducted gradually.

- Prior to the de-institutionalization of children, new components should be introduced to the system: the CRD (with guardianship function supported by a guardianship allowance), PMPC, JJAP, and other services such as day-care centres.<sup>2</sup>
- In the short term, additional investments are necessary to deal with plausible increments in the public expenditure in child protection, in particular for the establishment of an alternative service system prior to the de-institutionalization of children.
- The current financial crisis puts further pressure on the government budget, and the funding of existing institutions for children. In that context, the establishment of cost-efficient appropriate alternative services should be given priority.
- The long-term financial sustainability of the system will be favoured by closing some of the traditional residential institutions. For this condition to be met commitment is needed by the government to use the created fiscal space to finance the new system and invest savings into the creation of additional services.
- The financial planning of alternative child protection should become part of the ongoing MTEF process in order to ensure the medium-term sustainability of the policy reform.
- In the long term, the conditions of children will improve only if the new components of the system function properly. This implies that staff has to be trained to function as social workers in the newly established CRDs, PMPCCs and JJAPs..
- The new child protection system should acknowledge the relation between the well-being of children and the well-being of their families. In this respect, monitoring the conditions of children at home is a crucial aspect for the success of the reform.
- The reform of the child protection system benefits should form an integral part of the overall reform of the social service and social protection system in Tajikistan. The different components, such as the reform of the benefit and service system are mutually reinforcing.
- Reforming an existing policy system creates resistance among directly affected stakeholders that fear the loss of influence, or even the loss of their job that may result from the reform. A concerted effort involving all relevant government authorities is therefore recommended.

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<sup>2</sup> Child Rights Department (CRD), Psychological Medical Pedagogical Consultation Center (PMPC), Juvenile Justice Alternative Projects (JJAP).

## 1. INTRODUCTION

With a little more than 7 million inhabitants, Tajikistan is one of the smaller economies in the World and the smallest in Central Asia, in terms of the size of its GDP. According to the International Monetary Fund (2008), its estimated GDP per capita for 2008 is less than seven hundred dollars which is the lowest from the group of former soviet republics of the region, including Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Tajikistan has the second lowest tax revenue as a percentage of GDP among the CIS countries, only slightly above the Kyrgyz Republic. As a result, Tajikistan highly relies on external resources, limiting public expenditures in general, and social expenditures in particular. In 2005, Tajikistan spent 9.4 per cent of its GDP in the social sectors, including health, education, social security and welfare and other social services (IMF, 2007).

Tajikistan is a country of children; the proportion of the population aged 14 or below with respect to the population aged between 15 and 49 is the highest of the CIS countries and the composition of households reflect this. More than 50 percent of Tajik households have 4 children or more. Frequently, these children face conditions at home that threaten not only their well-being, but even their lives; in 2005, the country had an infant mortality rate of 59 and an under-5 mortality rate of 71 (per 1000 live births), both higher than the figures of Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan (UNICEF, 2007). Child poverty is significantly higher than the overall poverty: 66 percent of children aged below 18 are poor, whereas the poverty rate for adults is 61 percent (University of Southampton/UNICEF, 2007).

Although vulnerable and needy children are entitled to social protection through insurance, assistance and care mechanisms, these are organized under a complex and inefficient system that still preserves some features from the Soviet period. Institutional care is one of the main components of this Child Protection System (CPS); more than twelve thousand children were residing in closed institutions in 2006, including boarding schools and sanatoriums (the number of children at institutions had been decreased to 9500 in 2008, according to the National Commission on Child Rights). The CPS is ineffective in supporting and protecting the children, not the least because it is poorly governed and structurally underfinanced.<sup>3</sup>

Given these conditions, UNICEF embarked on reviewing the system of child protection with the main purpose of identifying opportunities and challenges to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. Pilot projects supported by UNICEF have focused on the development of a comprehensive child protection system that is based on the premise that children are better in their homes than in institutions. These projects include:

- Diversion projects for youth in conflict with the law (JJAP)
- Pedagogical, Medical, Psychological Consultation
- Parents' Education Center/Kindergarten Inclusion Projects

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<sup>3</sup> For a review of the existing child protection system, see MGSOG/Unicef (2008), Child Protection in Tajikistan: Mapping actors, roles, benefits and costs.

- Child Rights Departments at district level (in charge of the introduction of a Guardianship system<sup>4</sup>)

Scaling up these initiatives and integrating them into the system warrant an analysis of their cost efficiency and effectiveness. In this regard, this report will analyse the costs and benefits of alternative child protection services and compare them with the existing system. The analysis will help identifying the possible fiscal space for the reforms so that the child welfare reform initiatives become sustainable and an integral part of the overall government program.

The de-institutionalization of children requires the availability of alternative services. Without this pre-condition met, children may be even worse off once they have left the institution. Unicef can encourage the successful implementation of the reform by emphasizing the importance of procuring an optimal equilibrium between the de-institutionalization process and the introduction of new components to the child protection system.

### *Objectives of the analysis*

The main objective of this analysis is to systematically compare costs and benefits of the current and alternative child protection services under various scenarios. More specifically, this report aims at answering the following questions:

- To what extent are the new initiatives in child welfare more effective and efficient in protecting vulnerable children?
- What are the costs and benefits of the traditional versus alternative child protection services?
- What is the level of potential savings that can be achieved by transforming the existing institutions?
- To what extent will this fiscal space be sufficient to finance alternative community-based social services for children in need and their families?

The tools developed in this report can be used by policy makers and other stakeholders for the ex-ante analysis of the financial impact of alternative child protection policies.

The structure of the report is as follows: The next section outlines the profile of the alternative services used as the basis for the cost benefit analysis, followed by two sections on the methodology and the data used. Section 5 describes the different policy scenarios and the underlying assumptions. In section 6, we compare costs and benefits of the current system with the alternative scenarios. Subsequently, the report discusses the implications of the findings for policy making and ends with a concluding section.

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<sup>4</sup> UNICEF and the NCCR have supported pilot projects that consist of the introduction of a Guardianship system in Tajikistan, under the framework of the de-institutionalization process.

## 2. ALTERNATIVE SERVICES FOR A NEW SYSTEM OF CHILD PROTECTION

At present, the child protection system in Tajikistan relies heavily on institutional care, which includes boarding schools for orphans and children from poor families; institutions for disabled; sanatoriums; children's homes; and special schools for children in conflict with the law (Table 1). In 2008, these institutions hosted nearly nine thousand five hundred children<sup>5</sup>.

Next to institutional care, vulnerable and needy children are entitled to transfers, such as the cash compensation for the poor, to which the 20 per cent poorest school children are eligible, and the social pension for full orphans.

Table 1. COMPONENTS OF THE CURRENT POLICY

INSTITUTIONALIZED CHILDREN				
INSTITUTION	NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS		NUMBER OF CHILDREN	
	2006	2008	2006	2008
Boarding school for orphan children and children from poor families (and preschool)	61		8583	
Boarding school for disabled children and sanatoriums	18		2332	
Children's home	11	11	810	
Special school for children in conflict with the law	1	1	100	70
Special vocational school for children in conflict with the law	1	1	35	24
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>92</b>		<b>11860</b>	<b>9500</b>

Source: UNICEF.

The policy alternative consists of a set of programs that are based on the premise that a well-functioning family is the best environment for children's development. Furthermore, this child protection model is the result of the thorough revision of several pilot programs that have been implemented in Tajikistan over the past years, with the support of UNICEF, the EC and several other international and national organizations.

In a new system of child protection, many different governmental and nongovernmental organizations will provide a range of functions and services to improve the well-being of vulnerable children and their families. For the purposes of this analysis we have identified three primary program models that are being developed within Tajikistan as part of a new system of child protection. These models are:

- Child Rights Departments (CRD)
- Psychological, Medical, Pedagogical Consultation Centers (PMPCC)
- Juvenile Justice Alternative Projects (JJAP)

<sup>5</sup> NCCR, 2008.

These three program models were selected for the following reasons: They assist the primary groups of vulnerable children who should be served by a new system of child protection. These are children living in their own families at risk of abuse or neglect, children in need of out-of-home placement, children in need of reintegration into families, and abandoned, homeless and street children (CRDs)<sup>6</sup>; children with mental and physical disabilities (PMPCCs); and children in conflict with the law (JJAPs).

- These program models are currently piloted in Tajikistan. Each model has been providing services, assisting individuals and families, and demonstrating their effectiveness. These models are not hypothetical, idealized programs but have been designed and implemented to meet the empirical situation of children and families in Tajikistan, using the limited resources that are available.
- These program models, to varying degrees, have been assessed. They have been shown to provide needed and useful assistance to the children and families they serve.
- These program models have been embraced by the Republican Government of Tajikistan, and by regional and local governments. Different levels of government and different ministries see them as effective programs that provide important assistance to children and families. Programs using each of these models are being supported with in-kind and financial support by the national, regional and local governments.
- These programs primarily provide remedial services rather than preventive services. Whereas a preventive approach to child protection is a more effective way to ensure the well-being of children and families in the long-term, a preventive approach is likely to be more expensive in the short-term. Since Tajikistan is facing severe financial constraints in the short-term, these three service models provide a targeted, remedial, and less costly approach than preventive service models.

In summary, these three program models create the foundation for an effective, low cost system of child protection that can reach a wide range of vulnerable children in Tajikistan. These models, however, do not provide the entire range of services that vulnerable children and families might need, nor do these models ensure that all vulnerable children and families would be reached by these programs. But the three models provide the foundation upon which a comprehensive, effective, far reaching, cost efficient child protection system could be developed<sup>7</sup>.

Child Rights Department (with guardianship functions): These departments, under local hukumats, operate as the core of a new child protection system. They provide assistance to children with disabilities, deinstitutionalized children, arrange for guardianship (placement of children in homes of relatives), adoptions. They also play a gate keeping role to reduce the number of children placed in residential institutions. There are now nine local CRDs throughout the country. The National Government decree of August 2008 mandated the creation of a CRD in each of the 66 districts

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<sup>6</sup> The CRD terms of reference would need to be changed to include all functions mentioned here. CRDs are also responsible for the Guardianship system.

<sup>7</sup> For a full description of the alternative service models see annex 1.

throughout the country. The local CRDs are regulated by the National Commission on Child Rights under the Government of Tajikistan. Children without adequate parental care can be placed in the homes of relatives and less frequently non-relatives.

Guardianship placements have been carried out under the local Guardianship Authority. A Guardianship Authority had existed in every district in the country. As of August 2008 that responsibility was formally transferred to the Child Rights Departments. The Guardianship family should receive a monthly allowance until the child is 18 (at present, the level of the allowance varies according to the financial capacities of the local hukumats and, in many cases, not all eligible families receive it<sup>8</sup>).

Psychological Medical Pedagogical Consultation Center (PMPCC): These units provide diagnosis, referral and therapy for children who have physical and mental disabilities. The PMPCCs try to integrate children with disabilities into mainstream kindergartens and schools. They play a gate keeping role to reduce the number of children placed in residential institutions. There are now four PMPCCs throughout the country.

Juvenile Justice Alternative Project (JJAP): The JJAP provides rehabilitative services for juveniles who have committed minor offences, as an alternative to residential placement. There are currently three Juvenile Justice Alternative Projects.

The Parents Education Centre and other pilot programs that treat disabled children are not included in this analysis because their effectiveness has not been formally evaluated or because their functions overlap with the functions of the included programs.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

For the present analysis we systematically compare costs and benefits of the current and alternative child protection services under various scenarios. Carefully describing costs and benefits of different policy alternatives serves an important tool for decision-making. Cost-benefit analysis provides a framework allowing public authorities to make policy choices. It weighs the total (expected) costs against the total (expected) benefits of a policy. Ideally, all costs and benefits are expressed in monetary terms and adjusted over time. It implies assigning a monetary value to all costs and benefits. However, constructing plausible values for a specific policy can be very difficult, especially for intangible costs and benefits, such as a longer life or increased well-being.

In its simple form, cost-benefit analysis uses financial costs and benefits. For example, to assess the expected value of building a new road, one would measure the costs of building the road and subtract them from the economic benefits of improved access to markets. While the latter may already pose a challenge, other aspects, such as environmental damage associated with building the road, or benefits of easier travel, are even more difficult to measure.

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<sup>8</sup> Rights and Prosperity (NGO), report issued in 2006.

The accuracy of a cost-benefit analysis depends on the accuracy of the costs and benefits used in the model. Cost estimates are usually derived from past experience, and benefits often rely on estimates. As such, the outcomes of any cost-benefit analysis must be treated with caution.

The analysis of costs and benefits follows four steps. The first refers to the identification of direct and indirect costs and benefits that would result from each of two policies that are compared, the current policy and the alternative policy. Among the direct costs, it is possible to identify, for example, the costs of operation of child protection programs, while indirect costs would be costs imposed, for instance, to the social assistance system if the analyzed policy results in more eligible people claiming benefits of that type<sup>9</sup>.

For the current analysis of child protection policies, the following costs and benefits need to be considered (table 2 and 3). Note that not all costs and benefits are measurable in the current context.

Table 2. SUMMARY OF TYPE OF COSTS

TYPE OF COST	CONCEPT	DEFINITION
DIRECT	Capital costs related to setting-up, strengthening or maintaining the programs or institutions (for example, the purchase of a building or equipment)	Costs expressed in monetary terms (projections of costs are based on observed costs)
	Recurrent costs related to operating the programs or institutions (such as food costs, stationery, staff salaries, maintenance, social transfers).	Costs expressed in monetary terms (projections of costs are based on observed costs)
INDIRECT	(Increased) criminality	Criminality outcomes
	(Deteriorated) physical health of children served by programs or institutions	Physical health outcomes
	(Deteriorated) nutritional status of children served by programs or institutions	Nutritional status outcomes
	(Deteriorated) mental health of children served by programs or institutions	Mental health outcomes
	Pressure on social assistance (i.e. Number of people claiming benefits like the cash compensation for the poor)	Costs expressed in monetary terms (obtained by multiplying the number of beneficiaries by the average benefit)

Note: Non-shaded cells indicate costs that are not included in the quantitative analysis because they are not measurable in the current context.

Table 3. SUMMARY OF TYPE OF BENEFITS

TYPE OF	CONCEPT	DEFINITION
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<sup>9</sup> For example, if the policy analyzed is a program that has the main objective of de-institutionalizing children without providing them other forms of social protection, these children might demand social assistance transfers provided by the State (such as the cash compensation for the poor or the full orphan pension). Thus, the (indirect) costs related to the provision of such benefits will be borne by the public finance.

BENEFIT		
DIRECT	Reduced number of children institutionalized	Number of children de-institutionalized
INDIRECT	(Increased) productivity of children when adults	Increase of per capita GDP; increase of per capita labour income.
	(Decreased) criminality	Criminality outcomes
	(Improved) mental health of children served by programs or institutions	Mental health outcomes
	(Improved) nutritional status of children served by programs or institutions	Nutritional status outcomes
	(Improved) physical health of children served by programs or institutions	Physical health outcomes

Note: Non-shaded cells indicate benefits that are not included in the quantitative analysis because they are not measurable in the current context.

Quantifying and assigning a monetary value to the identified costs and benefits is the second step in the analysis. The nature of the costs and benefits identified in the tables above necessitates the combination of quantitative and qualitative information. The quantitative dimension relates to the analysis of financial information, using budget modelling tools. Data on funding sources and execution of budgets are analyzed systematically and thoroughly to generate a set of cost indicators that allow us to compare the policy options for different scenarios.

In some cases, particularly in the case of some benefits, it is not possible or desirable to assign a monetary value (mostly, this is related to the lack of data). For example, this might be the case of benefits such as the improvement in the mental health of children or achievement of their emotional stability. Given that assigning precise values to all costs and benefits related to providing protection to children is not possible, it is important to supplement the analysis with qualitative information. Evidence from other countries can complement the quantitative dimension and serve as guidelines for the identification of costs and benefits that cannot be directly measured.

The third step in the analysis is the projection of costs and benefits for the two policy options over time. In this case, the critical challenge is to guarantee that the underlying theories, assumptions and facts that shape the results influence the two policy options in a comparable way. For instance, if we assume that some costs of the current policy and the alternative policy are affected by the general inflation rate of the country, we must assume that the rate is the same in both cases. This is crucial to avoid bias in the comparison of the policies and to ensure the robustness of the conclusions concerning which is the best option.

The fourth step is the actual comparison of the different outcomes. The cost indicators are the total cost, the cost per child and the child marginal cost, for each policy scenario; other non-measurable costs are discussed, including criminality and deteriorated mental and physical health statuses. Costs are calculated from the collected data of the traditional and pilot programs: first, costs are calculated per program or institution, and then they are added-up to form the total cost of the policy option. The average cost is obtained by dividing the total cost by the number of children served, while the marginal costs per child are proxied by the food cost (see table 4).

The main benefit indicator we use is the increase of productivity of children when they grow-up, which would result from the improvement of their environment during childhood if the system moves towards de-institutionalization. We also discuss other non-measurable benefits that are related to long-term increments in productivity, such as the improvement of children's mental and physical health, and the improvement of their nutritional status that result from moving a child from a closed institution to a well-functioning family (see table 5).

The relationship between well-being and being productive has been widely documented (Bateman and Organ 1983, Spector 1997, George and Brief 1992, Staw and Barsade 1993, Diener and Seligman 2004, Wright and Cropanzano 2004). For instance, a person that has a good health status is more productive than a person that is ill (Kessler and Stang 2006). The main assumption in the benefit analysis is associated to relationships of this type, as described next.

Table 4. SUMMARY OF COST INDICATORS

CONCEPT	DEFINITION	INDICATOR
TOTAL COST	Sum of all costs related to the implementation of the policy (program, institution or system)	Sum of all costs, including capital costs, recurrent costs or other
AVERAGE COST (COST PER CHILD)	Total cost averaged over the number of children served by the policy (program, institution or system)	Total cost divided by the number of children served
MARGINAL COST PER CHILD	Additional cost generated by including in the policy (program, institution or system) an additional child at any given level of service	Total costs minus the costs that do not change when an additional child is included in the policy (program, institution or system), divided by the number of children, at the given level of service*.
OPPORTUNITY COST	Cost of the best alternative option	Not measurable in this context

\*The term *given level of service* refers to the number of children served. In the case of traditional institutions, marginal costs are proxied by the food costs; in the case of the PMPCC, it's proxied by the cost per child; in the case of the JJAP, it's proxied by the cost of activities per child. To obtain the marginal costs per child of the whole model, the allowances are added.

Table 5. SUMMARY OF BENEFIT INDICATORS

CONCEPT	DEFINITION	INDICATOR
PRODUCTIVITY	Added value to the total production of a given sector or the economy that results from the work performed by one person or group of people	GDP per capita by economic sector; per capita labour income by economic sector

CHILD PHYSICAL HEALTH	Physical health status of the child	Educational achievement, such as last grade studied, enrolment rates, drop-out rates, regular attendance, academic grades*.
CHILD MENTAL HEALTH	Mental health status of the child	
CHILD NUTRITIONAL STATUS	Nutritional status of the child	Same as above, plus number of meals eaten per day; average daily calorie intake, height, weight, BMI*

\*These indicators can be considered as output and outcome indicators. They are not measured due to the lack of comparative data

The impact of a good family environment is vital for the development of children. Furthermore, various evidence suggests that factors like a good family environment (i.e. free of violence) influence significantly the labour market opportunities and the wages of children when adults (Corak 2006, Nolan and Whelan 2004, Levine 1999). The main assumption in the benefit analysis is, precisely, that the implementation of a child protection model that effectively addresses the needs of children will lead to a significant improvement of the labour market opportunities of the children served, with the respective impact on their productivity and wages.

#### *Time-horizon of the analysis*

The methodology used in this analysis relies on two different approaches regarding the time dimension. The first is the static approach, which refers to a snapshot analysis that primarily consists of comparing costs of serving a fixed number of children under the current policy and under the alternative policy at today's values. The main advantage of this approach is that it offers the possibility of addressing important direct or indirect effects generated by the policies that cannot be quantified in the long term or for which no reliable projections can be made due to the lack of data or untrustworthy data. Some of the most important benefits potentially produced by the alternative policy are good examples of such indirect effects, like the reduced criminality caused by the implementation of diversion centres (JJAP).

The second approach is the dynamic analysis. According to this, costs and benefits are identified, quantified and projected for a given time-horizon, which allows us to study issues that cannot be analyzed under the static approach, such as a step-wise implementation of the policies.

## 4. DATA

### *Data sources*

The cost-benefit analysis is based on a model that utilizes information from several sources. Regarding the costs, it considers data from the costs borne by institutions that provide child care, including boarding schools, institutions for the disabled, children's home, sanatoriums and institutions for children in conflict with the law<sup>10</sup>. In addition, the model relies on information

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<sup>10</sup> Most of the information entered in the model comes from data collection that was carried out directly at the institutions.

gathered through the pilot projects supported by UNICEF, which give foundation to an alternative child protection model; these data describe the costs related to the implementation of Child Rights Departments (CRDs) and a Guardianship system under its responsibility, Psychological Medical and Pedagogical Consultation Centres (PMPCC), and Juvenile Justice Alternative Projects (JJAP).

The data were collected directly at the child care institutions and at various pilot centres, offices of the local and republican governments and offices of international organizations and other members of the international community present in Tajikistan (see annex 4 for a complete list). In districts where the GC and CoM have been substituted by a Child Rights Department (CRD), interviews were held with the staff of the CRDs.

#### *Validation of data and data reliability*

To obtain reliable data on any particular issue is not a minor challenge in Tajikistan. Financial data are especially difficult to obtain and often not reliable. Even when detailed information at the level of institutions is available, it is clear that on many occasions these data should be treated with caution as they may not be consistent with similar data from other agencies. For example, information provided at the ministry level regarding the number of children in residential care differs from the data observed at the institutions because the information possessed by ministries is not always up-to-date; similarly, available financial data at the ministry level often refers to planned expenditures, while institutions report actual data (as well as planned data).

For this analysis, data were collected and validated taking as an advantage the presence of pilot projects that have been supported by UNICEF (Box 1). The methodology used is based on the information on costs observed at a site where the alternative policy had been implemented and costs observed in control cases.

Information for pilot projects was collected in Khujand (Sugd oblast), and Bokhtar (Khatlon oblast), whereas the control case chosen is Rudaki, also located in the Khatlon oblast. Detailed information on costs was collected in these sites and other districts, including Dushanbe, Kurgan Tube and Jomi, for two main reasons: to gain insight into the child protection system in the country and to validate the data obtained on costs by comparing them with norms and observed data in other sites.

An additional and very important reason to collect data in several districts is that there is no single district in which all alternative programs have been implemented.

The information collected in the pilot and control districts was used to construct models of all the programs and institutions that are part of the current and alternative policies. For example, the data from Rudaki, the control district, was used to create average cost structures of boarding schools, institutions for disabled and other traditional care institutions. The information from Khujand and Bobojon Ghafurov was used to profile the costs of implementing PMPCC and JJAP, respectively (see table 6).

**Table 6. CASES USED TO CONSTRUCT MODELS OF AVERAGE COST STRUCTURES OF PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS**

TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION/PROGRAM
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TYPE OF INSTITUTION	CASE USED TO CONSTRUCT MODEL OF AVERAGE COST STRUCTURE
BOARDING SCHOOL	Boarding schools in Rudaki
INSTITUTION FOR DISABLED	Institution for disabled in Rudaki
SANATORIUM	Sanatorium in Rudaki
SPECIAL VOCATIONAL SCHOOL (for children in conflict with the law)	Special vocational school in Dushanbe
SPECIAL SCHOOL (for children in conflict with the law)	Special school in Dushanbe
ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTION/PROGRAM	
TYPE OF INSTITUTION	CASE USED TO CONSTRUCT MODEL OF AVERAGE COST STRUCTURE
JUVENILE JUSTICE ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM (JJAP)	JJAP in Bobojon Ghafurov
PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICAL PEDAGOGICAL CONSULTATION CENTER (PMPCC)	PMPCC in Khujand (Sugd oblast)
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS DEPARTMENT (CRD)	CRD cost structure based on Isfara (Sugd oblast) and Kurgan Tube (Khatlon oblast)

Next to the corroboration of official data on costs, interviews were conducted with various actors to address subjects like production for self-consumption carried out at the institutions or programs and contributions in-kind made to these. Matters like these are of great importance for the real costs of providing protection to children under the current system.

#### Box 1 NOTE ON THE VALIDATION OF DATA

Several activities were conducted to validate the data used in this analysis, including:

- Comparison of planned and actual expenditures of various programs (or institutions) of the same type, as well as between programs of different types.
- Consultation of different sources to obtain information of the same kind of a wide array of programs and institutions, including programs and institutions run by the government and programs and institutions run by non-governmental organizations.
- Interviews with several actors to understand the management of programs and institutions and to corroborate that the operation of these is consistent with the data on costs.
- Interviews with various actors to address subjects like production for self-consumption carried out at the institutions or programs, as well as contributions in-kind made to these.

#### *Limitations*

The data used in this analysis are not available with the same detail for all programs or institutions. In the case of traditional institutions, although the financial information is reported by category,

contributions in kind are not systematically recorded, which makes it impossible to estimate them reliably. As a result, costs of boarding schools, institutions for disabled, sanatoriums and other traditional institutions are underestimated. In the case of the pilot programs (JJAP and PMPCC), the financial information is not sufficiently detailed, which makes it impossible to analyze costs by category (i.e. it is not possible to clearly distinguish between capital costs and recurrent costs).

The costs of training qualified staff that is required to set up and provide alternative care (such as specialized social workers) are not included in the analysis due to the lack of reliable data. Therefore, the total costs of the alternative policies are underestimated.

With respect to benefits, the lack of data impedes the analysis of the impact of policies on important outcomes like the physical and mental health statuses of children. Thus, the analysis focuses on the long-term indirect benefit caused by policies, which is expressed as productivity gains.

This analysis is based on a deterministic model<sup>11</sup> that allows the user to account for possible behavioural responses of the beneficiaries of the policies by providing flexibility to analyze various scenarios. However, the model does not describe in detail the behaviour of the beneficiaries of the policies mainly due to the lack of data that would be necessary to include the reaction of all actors involved in different policy scenarios (especially, the reactions of the recipients of the social benefits).

To test for behavioural responses of the actors affected by the policy (potential beneficiaries and actual beneficiaries of the social systems, mainly) and the actors that influence the policy (policy makers), it would be necessary to collect extensive data at the household level on the relationships between household members in Tajikistan, addressing issues like the distribution of tasks within the household, the allocation of resources within the household and the decision-making processes followed by household members.

## 5. POLICY SCENARIOS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The analysis presented here is based on the comparison of four policy scenarios: the current policy scenario and three scenarios that represent policy alternatives.

The current policy scenario is characterized by a child protection system that relies on institutional care, including boarding schools, institutions for disabled, sanatoriums, and special institutions for children in conflict with the law (special school and special vocational school). Programs such as PMPC, JJAP and CRD were implemented as pilots (financed mainly through development assistance) and formally included in the system in 2008<sup>12</sup>. Therefore, these activities are not included in the

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<sup>11</sup>In some cases, where the context is suitable, models like this include the estimation and use of probabilities, for example, the probability that parents take their children to a closed institution, given that a particular policy is implemented. When a model, like this one, does not use probabilities, it is called *deterministic model*.

<sup>12</sup> Although these programs have been included in the system, the extent to which local authorities will implement it remains to be seen.

current policy scenario. The number of children living in boarding schools is kept constant in the current policy scenario. With respect to institutions for disabled children, an increase in the number of institutionalized children is assumed over time based on the observed average increase for the past three years. Finally, it is considered that in this scenario children might be entitled to transfers like the cash compensation for the poor or full orphan pension.

The annual total costs that correspond to the cash compensation for the poor and the full orphan pension are the same in the current scenario and the alternative scenarios. This assumption is made because although the de-institutionalization of children in the alternative scenarios might increase the pressure from claimants to obtain these social assistance benefits, the introduction of the guardianship allowance compensates the effect.

The alternative scenarios differ from each other with respect to the rate of de-institutionalization of children, the number of CRD, JJAP and PMPC adequately implemented and the level of guardianship allowance (see annex 2 for an overview of the assumptions).

In the first alternative scenario, moderate de-institutionalization of children is observed, while the guardianship allowance increases gradually over time. Also, 33 Child Rights Departments are properly set-up during the studied period. The scenario of low de-institutionalization is characterized as one in which a total of 14 institutions are going to be closed over time (10 boarding schools and 4 institutions for disabled), only 20 CRDs are implemented by the end of the period and the guardianship allowance stays during the time-horizon at the level of 2008. In contrast, in the third scenario the de-institutionalization continues and progresses rapidly; in this scenario (high de-institutionalization), the guardianship allowance doubles by the end of the analyzed period and CRDs are set-up adequately in all districts. De-institutionalization can be achieved in several ways: on the one hand, children can be removed from residential institutions and placed back into a family environment, which is often difficult to achieve. On the other hand, active gate-keeping will ensure that fewer children are newly admitted to residential institutions, thereby reducing the number of children living in boarding schools or other traditional institutions.

Figure 1





Figure 2



The three scenarios also differ from each other in terms of the number of PMPC and JJAP, as shown in Table 7. In all the alternative scenarios it is assumed that the number of children at each institution remains constant (i.e. the inflow of children equals the outflow), with the exception of the remaining institutions for disabled children, which allows for a small further inflow of children. In all

scenarios some institutions will remain, as there will always be children who really need institutional care (figure 1 and figure 2).

Table 7. DESCRIPTION OF THE FOUR POLICY SCENARIOS OVER TIME

YEAR	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>CURRENT POLICY (NO DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION)</b>											
NUMBER OF BOARD. SCHOOLS	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
NUMBER OF INSTIT. FOR DISAB.	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN INSTIT. (THOUSAND)	11	11.26	11.29	11.33	11.36	11.40	11.43	11.47	11.50	11.54	11.57
<b>POLICY ALTERNATIVE: MODERATE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>											
NUMBER OF BOARD. SCHOOLS	61	57	53	50	47	43	41	38	35	33	31
NUMBER OF INSTIT. FOR DISAB.	16	15	15	14	13	13	12	12	11	10	10
GUARDIANSHIP ALLOWANCE (TS/month per child)	0	60	63	66	70	74	77	82	86	90	100
NUMBER OF CRD	0	10	11	13	14	16	18	20	23	26	33
NUMBER OF JJAP	0	5	5	6	7	7	8	8	9	10	12
NUMBER OF PMPC	0	4	4	5	6	6	7	8	9	10	12
NUMBER OF DE-INSTITUT. CHILDREN (EACH YEAR)		586	553	521	492	464	438	414	391	369	349
NUMBER OF DE-INSTITUT. CHILDREN (ACCUMULATED)			1,138	1,660	2,152	2,616	3,054	3,468	3,859	4,228	4,577
<b>POLICY ALTERNATIVE: HIGH DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>											
NUMBER OF BOARD. SCHOOLS	61	55	49	44	39	35	31	28	25	22	20
NUMBER OF INSTIT. FOR DISAB.	16	15	14	13	12	11	11	10	9	9	8
GUARDIANSHIP ALLOWANCE (TS/month per child)	0	60	67	75	83	93	104	116	129	144	180
NUMBER OF CRD	0	10	12	15	18	21	26	31	37	45	66
NUMBER OF JJAP	0	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	14	16	20
NUMBER OF PMPC	0	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	13	15	20
NUMBER OF DE-INSTITUT. CHILDREN (EACH YEAR)		916	832	756	687	625	569	518	472	431	393
NUMBER OF DE-INSTITUT. CHILDREN (ACCUMULATED)			1,748	2,503	3,191	3,816	4,385	4,903	5,376	5,806	6,199
<b>POLICY ALTERNATIVE: LOW DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>											
NUMBER OF BOARD. SCHOOLS	61	60	59	58	57	56	55	54	53	52	51
NUMBER OF INSTIT. FOR DISAB.	16	16	15	15	14	14	13	13	13	12	12
GUARDIANSHIP ALLOWANCE (TS/month per child)	0	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60
NUMBER OF CRD	0	10	11	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	20
NUMBER OF JJAP	0	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	8
NUMBER OF PMPC	0	4	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	8
NUMBER OF DE-INSTITUT. CHILDREN (EACH YEAR)		223	219	215	211	207	203	199	195	192	188
NUMBER OF DE-INSTITUT. CHILDREN (ACCUMULATED)			443	658	869	1,076	1,279	1,478	1,673	1,865	2,053

Note 1: it is assumed that all de-institutionalized children receive a guardianship allowance.

Productivity is defined as the added value to the total production of a given economic sector by a person or group of people and is measured in the cost analysis as the per capita labour income of a given economic sector<sup>13</sup>. It is assumed that de-institutionalized children (older than 14 years<sup>14</sup>) are employed at the general employment rate and they receive the average labour income of the economic sector where this is highest (the productivity gain is estimated as the difference between this income and the average income of the economic sector where this is lowest).

Several assumptions are made with respect to the cost categories of the programs and institutions. In the case of food costs, salaries and costs of stationery, projections are made using the observed average rate of change over the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. Other costs were projected following an observed cyclical pattern, which is the case of maintenance costs, capital costs and other that according to the observed data are not borne continuously or increasingly over time (see annex 3 for an example). In cases where it was not possible to observe rates of change for a period of three years, costs were projected using one observed rate of change or replicating over time an observed fix value (see annex 4). Together, these assumptions may cause the underestimation of the total costs of the current system.

The study does not rely on a detailed description of the evolution of the economy in Tajikistan because too many uncertainties characterize the global economy after the financial crisis of 2008. In all scenarios, current and alternative, the same GDP growth rate and inflation rate is assumed (see annex 2).

## 6. COMPARING COSTS AND BENEFITS

The analysis is based on the main outputs that are generated by the cost and benefit model, which are indicators of total, per capita and marginal costs and benefits, both at the level of institutions and at the level of the whole system. Furthermore, this comparative analysis is done in static and dynamic forms, to test for variations of the conclusions across time horizons.

The basic premise of the study is that if a policy alternative that favours the permanence of children at home and under good conditions is less costly than the current policy, it should be chosen as the

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<sup>13</sup> High productivity is measured as per capita labour income in the sector of construction (the sector in which the per capita labour income is highest). Low productivity is measured as per capita labour income in the agriculture sector (the sector in which the per capita labour income is lowest).

<sup>14</sup> According to the ILO Minimum Age Convention (No. 138), the general minimum age that a person must have to enter the labour market is 14 years (in the case of countries whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed). Furthermore, although the Tajik Labour Code sets the minimum age at 16 years, it is plausible that de-institutionalized children will enter the labour market earlier.

best option of the two, given that there is wide and strong evidence and consensus that support the assertion that the best environment for the development of a child is a well-functioning family<sup>15</sup>.

### *Costs – Static comparison*

For the static comparison, the implementation of each of the three alternative policies was simulated separately as if all changes regarding the de-institutionalization of children and introduction of the JJAP, PMPC, CRD and guardianship allowance were introduced in year 2009. The estimates, reported in table 8, show that the three alternative scenarios are more costly than the current scenario, although not significantly. This suggests that the costs of institutional care are so high that they compare to the costs of introducing a whole new system at once, even in current terms. Indirect costs, such as an increased pressure on the existing social assistance transfers are not taken into account in the table below. Accounting for a guardianship allowance for all children de-institutionalized partly compensates for a potential need to increase transfers. However, the issue emerges how to treat future children in need, which are currently not living in an institution.

**Table 8. ESTIMATED COSTS IN A STATIC MODEL<sup>16</sup>**

YEAR 2009	CURRENT POLICY	MODERATE DE-INSTITUT.	HIGH DE-INSTITUT.	LOW DE-INSTITUT.
ASSUMED NUMBER OF BOARD. SCHOOLS	61	31	20	51
ASSUMED NUMBER OF INSTIT. FOR DISAB.	16	10	8	12
ASSUMED GUARDIANSHIP ALLOWANCE (TS/MONTH)	0	100	180	60
ASSUMED NUMBER OF CRD	0	33	66	20
ASSUMED NUMBER OF JJAP	0	12	20	8
ASSUMED NUMBER OF PMPC	0	12	20	8
ASSUMED NUMBER OF DE-INSTITUT. CHILDREN	0	4577	6199	2053
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST (Thousand TS per year)	50,573.8	50,987.2	52,076.9	51,033.6
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	0.290%	0.293%	0.299%	0.293%
ESTIMATED COST PER CHILD (TS per year)	1,690.7	1,254.4	982.2	1,423.5
ESTIMATED MARGINAL COST (TS per year)	528.0	376.2	284.8	483.2

**Note 1:** it is assumed that all de-institutionalized children receive a guardianship allowance.

**Note 2:** in the case of traditional institutions, marginal costs are proxied by the food costs; in the case of the PMPC, it's proxied by the cost per child; in the case of the JJAP, it's proxied by the cost of activities per child. To obtain the marginal costs per child of the whole model, the allowances are added.


### *Costs – Dynamic comparison*

<sup>15</sup> 'For more than 50 years, a variety of studies have shown that young children fare better in family like settings than in institutional care' (Barth, 2002).

<sup>16</sup> More details about the cost categories borne by care institutions are provided in the *Technical Note of the Cost-Benefit model of the Child Protection System in Tajikistan*.

The static model presented in the previous section is not realistic as policy reforms are implemented gradually. Therefore, a dynamic approach provides a better picture of the cost developments over time and resources needed.

Figure 3




In the long term, preserving the current policy is more costly than implementing an alternative policy that involves the de-institutionalization of children, the provision of a guardianship allowance and the operation of the PMPC, JJAP and CRD.

The current policy is more costly than any of the alternative policies in the long term because of the high operation costs of residential institutions. Barth, for instance, states that ‘the costs of institutional care far exceed those for foster care or treatment foster care<sup>17</sup>. The difference in monthly cost can be 6 to 10 times as high as foster care and 2 to 3 times as high as treatment foster care. Since there is virtually no evidence that these additional expenditures result in better outcomes for children, there is no cost-benefit justification for group care, when other placements are available’ (Barth 2002). In this respect, we find that in the scenario of high de-institutionalization the alternative policy would cost less than half of the cost of the current policy by year 2018. In the scenario of low de-institutionalization, the alternative policy is still 15 per cent less costly than the current system (figure 3) by the same year.

<sup>17</sup> In Tajikistan, guardianship is generally used for long-term placement of young children with their relatives though it is occasionally used for placement with non-relatives. Trusteeship is also for placement with relatives but is for older children. Foster care, the short-term or long-term placement of children with non-relatives generally does not exist in Tajikistan.


Figure 4



The marginal costs of alternative programs, such as the JJAP, PMPC and CRD, are lower than the marginal costs of traditional institutions (like boarding schools or residential institutions for the disabled). As a result, average marginal costs per child of the alternative policy as proportion of the average marginal cost per child of the current policy decrease in all scenarios as the traditional programs and institutions are closed and the alternative programs and institutions are introduced (figure 4).

The guardianship allowance is a marginal cost, but only in the case of the de-institutionalized children. Its inclusion does not significantly affect the average marginal costs of the alternative policy (which is calculated from the marginal cost of the de-institutionalized children served by the JJAP, PMPC and CRD and the marginal cost of the institutionalized children served at boarding schools, institutions for disabled, sanatoriums, the special school and the special vocational school).

Figure 5



As the difference between the marginal costs and the average costs per child of the alternative programs is small<sup>18</sup>, the proportions illustrated in figure 4 and figure 5 follow a similar pattern for the scenarios where a high number of institutions are closed. On the contrary, in the scenario of low de-institutionalization the proportions illustrated in the figures develop in seemingly different ways over time: given that the marginal cost of traditional institutions is proxied by the food costs, which is only one component of the total costs per child<sup>19</sup>, the number of traditional programs and institutions remaining in the system influences the total cost of the alternative policy as proportion of the total cost of the current policy relatively more than the relationship between the marginal costs per child.

Barth concludes that ‘...foster care and treatment foster care are more desirable and efficient than institutional care and their development should be treated as the priority of policy makers and program developers’ (Barth 2002).

The preference of alternative policies that aim at the permanence of children in well-functioning families over policies based on residential care is not only related to monetary costs. On the contrary, it has been shown that children who stay in closed institutions suffer in various ways: the lack of strong social networks, as they don’t feel connected to family and friends; they find it difficult

<sup>18</sup> In the case of the PMPC, the marginal costs are proxied by the average cost per child. For the JJAP the marginal costs are proxied by the average costs of activities per child, which is a major component of the total cost per child.

<sup>19</sup> In this case, the costs per child include other important cost categories that increase significantly over time, such as salary costs.

to integrate into the community during adult life; and they do not necessarily experience better material conditions at institutions, even when their condition at home might be precarious (Box 2).

## Box 2 INDIRECT COSTS OF RESIDENTIAL CARE

Comparing residential care with care at home
Despite the apparent benefit of relatively better living conditions, residential care carries invisible and long-term detrimental costs to children. Poor planning often exacerbates these problems.
Child development– Children in residential care often lose their connections to their families, clans and friends. This alienation, coupled with inadequate and inconsistent attention to developmental needs, especially of small children, leads to stunting of social and intellectual development.
Integration into the community– As residential care facilities are usually established in urban centers or isolated rural locations, they typically prevent connection between children and their clans. The stigma associated with residence in such a facility, and the separation of the child from the community, also hinders reintegration of children when they leave.
Care and protection– The placement of children in residential care facilities removes the community from its role as the monitor of the quality of childcare. Governments often inadequately fulfil this monitoring function, while the lack of a tradition of social work and child care centers in many countries may facilitate child abuse in residential care institutions.
Sustainability– While the ongoing cost of residential care varies considerably, such care can cost between USD\$500-800 per child per year. Despite the relative expense of this option, both governments and donors who fund such facilities often resist efforts to pursue other options with these resources.

Levine 2001.

### *Benefits*

In the short term, children benefit from a de-institutionalization policy as they would return to a family situation that enhances their emotional, mental and physical well-being. To ensure that their material conditions indeed improve, it is necessary to include in the alternative policy an allowance and to monitor their environments at home.

It has been shown that the substitution of the current policy by an alternative that favours the development of children in family contexts is convenient to reduce costs in the long term. Even more, this assertion holds in all scenarios analyzed. However, other important differences between scenarios must be addressed, such as their differentiated impact on the well-being of children. The rate of de-institutionalization, for instance, should be determined on the basis of what is best for the children, and not only by the projected costs. In this respect, it has been widely documented that well-functioning family contexts are much more favourable for the development of children than any type of closed care institution: 'An important review of studies on the outcomes of out-of-home

care indicates that young adults who have left group care are less successful than those who have left conventional care— a finding which is likely to be partially attributable to the selection of more troubled children into group care. Yet, recent evidence does indicate that the youth in group care and other forms of out of home care, at one year following placement, have poorer scores on developmental measures' (Barth 2002).

The consequences of institutionalization on children have been documented for many years; Frank, et al. (1996), explores 100 years' of pediatric and child psychiatry research covering five areas of potential biologic and social risk to infants and young children in orphanage care finding that: 'The available data from all sources consistently indicate five areas of risk to infants and young children in orphanage care: (1) infectious morbidity, (2) nutrition and growth, (3) cognitive development, (4) socio-affective development, and (5) physical and sexual abuse in the institution'.

Longitudinal studies, mainly based on information from Romanian children, comparing never institutionalized children with institutionalized children and with adopted children (western families, mainly American) have been the main source of information in the latest years. Even when the strength of the evidence varies according with the followed methodology and the quality of the information available in each case, it has been shown that children in institutional care have serious abnormalities during their life, associated with medical problems, like anomalies in the central nervous system functioning (Marshall et al. 2004); physical and brain growth deficiencies, e.g., low functional and metabolic activity (Chugani et al. 2001) and weak connections between brain regions (Eluvathingal et al. 2006); cognitive problems such as low IQ (Nelson et al. 2007) and attention problems (Kreppne et al. 2001 and Vorria et al. 1997); speech and language delays; sensory integration difficulties and stereotypes and social and behavioural abnormalities (Gunnar 2001, Zeanah et al. 2003, Morrisson et al. 1995 and Rutter et al. 1998).

Based on Romanian data, Mitrut (2008) reports that being in an institution diminishes enrolment rates in school: 'permanently institutionalized, e.g., orphans and social orphans, are significantly disadvantaged in school enrolment when compared to non-institutionalized children and also when compare to institutionalized children with family contact. Healthy, permanently institutionalized children are less likely to be enrolled in school than non-institutionalized healthy children'. Lower enrolment rates have permanent consequences on children's opportunities during adult life: 'Educational attainment has an influence on adult income and occupation' (Blait et al. 2006).


Van Ijzendoon et al. (2005) found that in terms of IQ and education achievement, adopted children outperform their siblings or peers who are left behind and perform as well as their peers in the general population. In a randomized controlled trial, Nelson et al. (2007) compared abandoned children reared in institutions to abandoned children placed in institutions but then moved to foster care. The cognitive development of the children was tracked through 54 months and in line with other studies they found that 'the cognitive outcome of children who remained in the institution was markedly below that of never-institutionalized children and children taken out of the institution and placed into foster care (with mean IQ of 73.3 when remaining in an institution, 109.3 when never institutionalized and 81.0 when going to foster care). The results point to the negative sequel of early institutionalization, suggest a possible sensitive period in cognitive development and underscore the advantages of family placements for young abandoned children'.

Institutional placements usually happen under difficult family conditions. In this respect, even when educational problems seem to be common under hard conditions at home, as shown by Barth (2002), such problems may be exacerbated for children in group care because residential care limits the options of children to be involved with positive aspects of the schools as extra-curricular activities. Even more, as shown by Nelson et al. (2007), many institutional settings are characterized by unfavorable caregiver-to-child ratios and highly regimented routines (e.g., all children eat, sleep, and toilet at the same time) affecting early development.

In addition, different studies show that skills needed for an independent living are poorly developed in an institutional setting: ‘Group care often fails to provide real life opportunities– like doing chores or preparing or purchasing food– that youth need to prepare for independent living’ (Barth 2002). ‘Institutional life exposes children to other negative effects, including institutional dependence and emotional deprivation, which may make the children poorly equipped for independent living’ (Mitrut, 2008).

The improved well-being of de-institutionalized children is expected to have a positive impact on the children’s future earnings. Measuring productivity as per capita labour income, productivity gains for the total economy would reach nearly .013 per cent of the GDP (more than 7.5 million TS) for the scenario with high de-institutionalization, while in the scenario of low de-institutionalization the productivity gains would be slightly more than .002 per cent of the GDP by the year 2018 (figure 6).

Figure 6



## 7. IS THERE A 'BEST' POLICY ALTERNATIVE: OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES

The main objective of the policy options analyzed here is to provide effective protection to the Tajik children. Important in this respect is that the basic premise of this comparative analysis is that a policy alternative that favours the permanence of children in a well-functioning family should be preferred over any policy that focuses on the institutionalization of children. In this context, another important objective is to ensure that the policy chosen as the best option for the children is also financially sustainable. This second objective is particularly important in the case of Tajikistan, where acknowledgeable efforts have been recently done by the State, such as the approval of a decree that mandates the creation of Child Rights Departments at the oblast and district levels.

Indeed, the analysis of costs and benefits leads to the conclusion that a policy that involves the de-institutionalization of children and the implementation of CRD, PMPC, JJAP and a guardianship allowance is better than the current policy.

#### *Timing matters: the relevance of step-wise implementation*

A step-wise implementation of policy changes is simulated in the three alternative scenarios. This is particularly relevant to ensure that children will indeed be better-off at home compared to their situation at the closed institutions; evidence suggests that de-institutionalization processes that are carried out too rapidly might harm children<sup>20</sup>.

In addition, institutional rigidities typically determine the pace of policy changes. These factors might include the resistance or lack of capacity of the bureaucracy to change rapidly. Important in this respect is that the Tajik government is currently training people to become social workers, which might improve the institutional capacity of the Tajik child protection system to move from a model that is based on closed institutional care to one that favours the permanence of children in well-functioning family contexts.

Next to the identification and implementation of the optimum rate of de-institutionalization of children, other measures must be adequately implemented to protect them. This includes the timely introduction of alternative programs and other components like the PMPC, CRD, JJAP and guardianship allowance.

Although the focus of the present analysis is on the de-institutionalization of poor, orphan or disabled children, the introduction of the JJAP as substitute to the traditional juvenile justice institutions implies a shift of approach to juvenile crime from punishment to prevention or remediation. Even more, as a large proportion of juvenile crime is related to subsistence (e.g. stealing food), the introduction of a guardianship allowance is part of the prevention approach in this matter<sup>21</sup>.

#### *Financing the best option*

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<sup>20</sup> For a detailed discussion of this topic see Tobis 2000.

<sup>21</sup> For further understanding of the JJAP and related issues, see Promoting children's rights in the juvenile justice system in the Republic of Tajikistan: Evaluation of the Juvenile Justice Alternatives Projects. 2008, Commission on Child Rights under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, technically and financially assisted by UNICEF and the Children's Legal Centre, UK.

The capacity to finance of an alternative child protection system, which includes the de-institutionalization of children and the introduction of a comprehensive model composed by the PMPC, CRD, JJAP and guardianship allowance, is influenced by its step-wise implementation. Alternative programs and institutions should be introduced gradually in different districts of the republic, as shown in table 7. From 2011 to 2012, for example, in the case of moderate de-institutionalization one CRD, one PMPC and one JJAP would be implemented and three boarding schools and one institution for disabled would be closed. At the same time, as mentioned, a guardianship allowance would be granted to de-institutionalized children. Fiscal space is gradually created by closing traditional institutions to the extent that, as it has been shown, in the long term the alternative policy is less costly than the current policy (table 9). If the de-institutionalization process is conducted at a slow pace, the shift from the current model to the alternative model might involve a short term increment in the expenditure in child protection (table 9).

**Table 9. FISCAL SPACE: SAVINGS VERSUS FUNDS NEEDED PER YEAR**

YEAR	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>POLICY ALTERNATIVE: MODERATE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
FISCAL SPACE CREATED EACH YEAR BY CLOSED INSTIT. (THOUSAND TS)	224	2,913	7,056	13,370	23,045	37,454	59,016	91,903	143,522	234,868
FISCAL SPACE CREATED EACH YEAR BY CLOSED INSTIT. (% GDP)	0.001%	0.014%	0.029%	0.045%	0.065%	0.088%	0.116%	0.150%	0.195%	0.266%
FISCAL SPACE NEEDED EACH YEAR FOR NEW SYSTEM* (THOUSAND TS)	895	1,115	1,389	1,706	2,140	2,664	3,382	4,288	5,546	7,983
FISCAL SPACE NEEDED EACH YEAR FOR NEW SYSTEM (% GDP)	0.005%	0.005%	0.006%	0.006%	0.006%	0.006%	0.007%	0.007%	0.008%	0.009%
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (% GDP)	-0.004%	0.009%	0.023%	0.040%	0.059%	0.082%	0.109%	0.143%	0.188%	0.257%

\*The new system includes the CRD, JJAP, PMPC and the guardianship allowance.

<b>POLICY ALTERNATIVE: HIGH DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
FISCAL SPACE CREATED EACH YEAR BY CLOSED INSTIT. (THOUSAND TS)	346	4,583	10,903	20,346	34,476	55,067	85,391	130,811	200,922	323,304
FISCAL SPACE CREATED EACH YEAR BY CLOSED INSTIT. (% GDP)	0.002%	0.022%	0.044%	0.069%	0.097%	0.130%	0.167%	0.214%	0.274%	0.367%
FISCAL SPACE NEEDED EACH YEAR FOR NEW SYSTEM* (THOUSAND TS)	1,057	1,373	1,781	2,279	2,978	3,868	5,131	6,812	9,247	14,755
FISCAL SPACE NEEDED EACH YEAR FOR NEW SYSTEM (% GDP)	0.006%	0.007%	0.007%	0.008%	0.008%	0.009%	0.010%	0.011%	0.013%	0.017%
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (% GDP)	-0.004%	0.016%	0.037%	0.061%	0.089%	0.120%	0.157%	0.203%	0.261%	0.350%

\*The new system includes the CRD, JJAP, PMPC and the guardianship allowance.

POLICY ALTERNATIVE: LOW DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION										
FISCAL SPACE CREATED EACH YEAR BY CLOSED INSTIT. (THOUSAND TS)	95	1,017	2,509	4,683	8,143	13,496	21,376	33,984	55,170	96,670
FISCAL SPACE CREATED EACH YEAR BY CLOSED INSTIT. (% GDP)	0.001%	0.005%	0.010%	0.016%	0.023%	0.032%	0.042%	0.056%	0.075%	0.110%
FISCAL SPACE NEEDED EACH YEAR FOR NEW SYSTEM* (THOUSAND TS)	880	1,039	1,232	1,443	1,731	2,062	2,509	3,046	3,776	4,977
FISCAL SPACE NEEDED EACH YEAR FOR NEW SYSTEM (% GDP)	0.005%	0.005%	0.005%	0.005%	0.005%	0.005%	0.005%	0.005%	0.005%	0.006%
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (% GDP)	-0.005%	0.000%	0.005%	0.011%	0.018%	0.027%	0.037%	0.051%	0.070%	0.104%

\*The new system includes the CRD, JJAP, PMPC and the guardianship allowance.

If traditional institutions are closed more slowly and not enough resources are allocated to child protection, the policy scenario might converge to the scenario of low de-institutionalization, rather than to the high de-institutionalization scenario. This would involve a low level of guardianship allowance and relatively low number of CRD, JJAP and PMPC implemented.

In the long term, the availability of fiscal space (after financing the implementation of the alternative programs and institutions<sup>22</sup>) would give flexibility to the policy-making process and its efficient allocation would enhance the successful implementation of the new system (figure 7). The resources released from the traditional institutions closed every year (table 10) would be enough to finance training programs for social workers, increments of the guardianship allowance or strengthening of the PMPC, CRD and JJAP.

<sup>22</sup> The fiscal space released by closing traditional institutions should be used to finance the alternative system (and not diverted to other purposes).

Figure 7




Table 10. FISCAL SPACE CREATED PER YEAR (THOUSAND TS)

YEAR	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>MODERATE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (THOUSAND TS)	-495	2,036	5,991	12,103	21,506	35,614	56,771	89,197	140,196	230,438
<b>HIGH DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (THOUSAND TS)	-535	3,465	9,493	18,609	32,290	52,364	81,983	126,569	195,541	315,654
<b>LOW DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FISCAL SPACE CREATED AND NEEDED EACH YEAR (THOUSAND TS)	-609	204	1,570	3,617	6,903	12,076	19,710	32,052	52,882	93,846

Box 3 DEFINING FISCAL SPACE

"[Fiscal space] can be defined as room in a government's budget that allows it to provide resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position or the stability of the economy. The idea is that fiscal space must exist or be created if extra resources are to be made available for worthwhile government spending. A government can create fiscal space by raising taxes, securing outside grants, cutting lower priority expenditure, borrowing resources (from citizens or foreign lenders), or borrowing from the banking system (and thereby expanding the money supply). But it must do this without compromising macroeconomic stability and fiscal sustainability– making sure that it has the capacity in the short term and the longer term to finance its desired expenditure programs as well as to service its debt."

Peter Heller (2005), 'Back to Basics – Fiscal Space: What it is and how to get it', in: *Finance and Development*, 42(2).

### *Stance of UNICEF*

The main risk in reforming the child protection system is to de-institutionalize children without creating conditions to protect them. UNICEF can encourage the successful implementation of the reform to the system by highlighting the importance of procuring an optimum equilibrium between the de-institutionalization process and the introduction of new components to the system, given the financial constraints. In particular, UNICEF should advocate the implementation of the JJAP, PMPC, CRD and guardianship allowance and insist on the necessity of closing traditional institutions to ensure the long term financial sustainability of the whole system. Furthermore, the Government of Tajikistan will need support in the provision of qualified social workers.

## 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The decision to place a child in an institution can almost be considered to be a random selection. There are many more children in similar circumstances compared to the available financial and organizational capacities. Providing child protection services through alternative community-based models is cost-efficient and will eventually benefit many more vulnerable children and improve their well-being and the well-being of their families. The introduction of a child protection model that involves the de-institutionalization of children while favouring their permanence in well-functioning family contexts is not only the best in terms of the well-being of the Tajik children, but also less costly than the current model in the long term. Official data show that public expenditures in child protection have increased substantially in recent years. According to the Ministry of Finance, total public expenditure in institutional care increased with more than 20 percent from 2006 to 2007, reaching ten million somoni in 2007. From 2007 to 2008, the budget of child care institutions under the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection increased with 115 percent, although the number of children only grew with 30 percent. With public expenditures increasing significantly, cost-efficiency becomes even more important. By the year 2018, even in the scenario of low de-institutionalization the current policy would be nearly 15 per cent more costly than the alternative model; in the high de-institutionalization scenario, the current model would be almost twice as costly as the alternative policy.

Furthermore, it has been documented that good conditions during childhood impact positively the future chances on the labour market and income in adulthood, which suggests that Tajikistan might benefit from implementing a system that effectively protects children. However, the decision to change the child protection system in Tajikistan should be made carefully: a de-institutionalization process that is not accompanied by the introduction of additional measures might cause children more harm than benefit.

Some conditions are necessary to ensure a successful reform of the child protection system in Tajikistan:

- The process of de-institutionalization of children should be conducted gradually.
- Prior to the de-institutionalization of children, new components should be introduced to the system: the CRD (with guardianship function supported by a guardianship allowance), PMPC, JJAP, and other services such as day-care centres.<sup>23</sup>
- In the short term, additional investments are necessary to deal with plausible increments in the public expenditure in child protection, in particular for the establishment of an alternative service system prior to the de-institutionalization of children.
- The current financial crisis puts further pressure on the government budget, and the funding of existing institutions for children. In that context, the establishment of cost-efficient appropriate alternative services should be given priority.
- The long-term financial sustainability of the system will be favoured by closing some of the traditional residential institutions. For this condition to be met commitment is needed by the government to use the created fiscal space to finance the new system and invest savings into the creation of additional services.
- The financial planning of alternative child protection should become part of the ongoing MTEF process in order to ensure the medium-term sustainability of the policy reform.
- In the long term, the conditions of children will improve only if the new components of the system function properly. This implies that staff has to be trained to function as social workers in the newly established CRDs, PMPCs and JJAPs..
- The new child protection system should acknowledge the relation between the well-being of children and the well-being of their families. In this respect, monitoring the conditions of children at home is a crucial aspect for the success of the reform.
- The reform of the child protection system benefits should form an integral part of the overall reform of the social service and social protection system in Tajikistan. The different components, such as the reform of the benefit and service system are mutually reinforcing.

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<sup>23</sup> Child Rights Department (CRD), Psychological Medical Pedagogical Consultation Center (PMPC), Juvenile Justice Alternative Projects (JJAP).

- Reforming an existing policy system creates resistance among directly affected stakeholders that fear the loss of influence, or even the loss of their job that may result from the reform. A concerted effort involving all relevant government authorities is therefore recommended.

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## PROFILES

Tajikistan is in the process of creating a new system of child protection. It is being designed and implemented to better meet the needs of vulnerable children than did the former system of child protection which relied on residential institutions to assist vulnerable children. Residential institutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and in industrialized countries throughout the world, have been shown to be both harmful to children and costly for government.<sup>24</sup>

In a new system of child protection, many different governmental and nongovernmental organizations will provide a range of functions and services to improve the well-being of vulnerable children and their families. For the purposes of this analysis we have identified three primary program models that are being developed within Tajikistan as part of a new system of child protection. These models are:

- Child Rights Departments (CRD)
- Psychological, Medical, Pedagogical Consultation Centers (PMPCC)
- Juvenile Justice Alternative Projects (JJAP)

These three program models were selected for the following reasons:

1. They assist the primary groups of vulnerable children who should be served by a new system of child protection. These are children living in their own families at risk of abuse or neglect, children in need of out-of-home placement, children in need of reintegration into families, children in conflict with the law, and abandoned, homeless and street children (CRDs); children with mental and physical disabilities (PMPCCs); and children in conflict with the law (JJAPs).

2. These program models are already functioning in Tajikistan. Each model has been providing services, assisting individuals and families, and demonstrating their effectiveness. These models are not hypothetical, idealized programs but have been designed and implemented to meet the existing situation of children and families in Tajikistan, using the limited resources that are available.

3. These program models, to varying degrees, have been assessed. They have been shown to varying degrees to provide needed and useful assistance to the children and families they serve.

4. These program models have been embraced by the Republican Government of Tajikistan, and by regional and local governments. Different levels of government and different ministries see them as effective programs that provide important assistance to children and families. Programs using each of these models are being supported with in-kind and financial support by the national, regional and local governments.

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<sup>24</sup> "Moving from Residential Institutions to Community-Based Social Services in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," David Tobis, World Bank, 2000.

5. These programs primarily provide remedial services rather than preventive services. Whereas a preventive approach to child protection is a more effective way to ensure the well-being of children and families in the long-term, a preventive approach is likely to be more expensive in the short-term. Since Tajikistan is facing severe financial constraints in the short-term, these three service models provide a targeted, remedial, and less costly approach than preventive service models.

In summary, these three program models would create the foundation for an effective, low cost system of child protection that would reach the wide range of vulnerable children in Tajikistan. These models, however, would not provide the entire range of services that vulnerable children and families might need, nor would these models ensure that all vulnerable children and families would be reached by these programs. But the three models would provide the foundation upon which a comprehensive, effective, far reaching, cost efficient, child protection system could be developed.

Each of the program models currently operates in multiple locations throughout Tajikistan. Each of the profiles below describes the program model *as it currently operates in at least one location* in Tajikistan. Some components of each model are present in one or more locations but not in others. We have therefore chosen to present the most robust profile of each model as it actually exists.

#### CHILD RIGHTS DEPARTMENT

History: Beginning in 2004 the Government of Tajikistan in cooperation with UNICEF established five local pilot Child Rights Departments (CRDs) which have since expanded to nine pilot sites. The CRDs took over the functions of the local Commissions on Minors and in some locations perform the functions of the Guardianship Authorities.

The CRDs initially focused on promoting the process of deinstitutionalization of children who were being returned to their families and the community from four residential institutions. The CRDs also worked as gatekeepers for preventing and regulating future placement of children into institutions. About 1600 children have been returned to the community or to their families from residential institutions. The activities of the CRDs have expanded to focus on broader issues of child protection.

On August 1, 2008 the National Government Decree #377 mandated the creation of a CRD in each of the 66 districts throughout the country. The funding for each of the CRDs, however, must be authorized by each local Hukumat (local council) which as of November 2008 had not yet occurred.

Organizational Structure: The local CRDs are regulated by the National Commission on Child Rights (NCCR) under the Government of Tajikistan. The Commission was formed to promote the all-around protection of the rights and interests of children who need government support. NCCR coordinates policy decisions and regulates matters concerning children and families at social risks.

Locations: CRDs have been created in eight pilot districts in two regions (Sughd and Khatlon, which each has a regional CRD office) and in Dushanbe. The pilot districts are:

- Sughd Region: B.Gafurov, Kanibadam, Isfara, Khujand
- Khatlon Region: Bokhtar, Kurgon-Tube, Kabodiyon, A. Jomi
- Dushanbe

Target Population: The CRDs are responsible to assist orphaned children and children without parental care, children with mental and physical disabilities, children at risk living in families, homeless and street children, children in conflict with the law and other children in need of government support.

Program Model (Functions): The CRDs at the local level provide services and supports for vulnerable children and families, act as gatekeepers to prevent and regulate placement of children into residential institutions, and arrange for alternative family-type placements when out-of-home care is necessary. The specific functions carried out by CRDs vary but the range of activities includes:

Assessing the needs of children and families: Family and child assessments occur for children living in families who are at risk, identification of children with mental and physical disabilities to refer them for disability benefits; children who are at risk of out-of-home placement in residential institutions or in families. The CRDs are responsible for receiving and evaluating reports of suspected child abuse and neglect.

Assisting vulnerable children in families: The staff of the CRDs provides information, referral and other assistance to vulnerable children and their families (both for children who have been reintegrated into families and increasingly to children who are at risk within their families). This assistance includes counselling, identifying and helping secure benefits to which children and families are entitled, and referring the children and families to various governmental and non-governmental programs that provide assistance to children and families.

Guardianship and Trusteeship: The functions of the Guardianship Commissions have been transferred to the CRDs which have the authority to place children under 14 in guardianship and children 14 and older in trusteeship. These placements usually are with relatives but can also be with non-relatives. Fostering is not provided for or regulated by law in Tajikistan.

The purpose of guardianship and trusteeship under the Family Code<sup>25</sup> is to provide children without parental care with maintenance, support and education and to protect their rights and interests. An individual may seek to be a guardian or trustee of a child when the parents are dead, when the parents have been deprived of their rights or their rights have been limited, when the parents are recognized as incapacitated, sick, absent for a long period or when the parents have refused to take care of a child.

Neither the Family Code, nor the Guardianship Regulations, places a duty on the Guardianship Authority to seek a guardian for the child from within the family or the child's community. Rather, it is up to an individual to apply to be a guardian.

Under Article 155 of the Family Code, guardians are to be given a monthly sum for maintenance of children in their care, but are not otherwise paid.<sup>26</sup> The amount of the

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<sup>25</sup> Article 147 Family Code.

<sup>26</sup> Art. 155.5 and 155.6.

payment is currently TJS 40 (US\$12) per month for each child. This rate is based on the minimum salary and pension rates, which were last increased in mid-2007 by Presidential Decree. These funds are provided by the local Hukumat. In practice, local authorities do not have adequate resources to make these payments to all eligible families.

**Adoption:** The CRD does preliminary review and documentation for domestic adoptions. The court makes the final decision. The number of domestic adoptions is still very small with a total of 481 adoptions finalized in the entire country in 2007.<sup>27</sup>

**Gate-keeping:** The CRDs review the applications for placement of children in boarding schools, institutions for children in conflict with the law or other residential institutions. They try to find alternative solutions which include providing or arranging for assistance so that children can live safely within their families, or arranging for alternative community placements such as guardianship.

**Monitor the status of children:** The CRDs monitor the status of children who have been reintegrated into families from boarding schools or from other residential institutions. They also monitor the status of children who have been placed into guardianship or trusteeship.<sup>28</sup> However, the Regulations do not specify what form the monitoring is to take, how often or with what objective.

**Staffing:** Staffing level varies in the CRDs but the proposed CRD office will have a director and perhaps one or two other staff. It is possible that staff from existing Social Assistance at Home Units of local Social Protection Departments will make home visits to vulnerable families. Staff turnover now is relatively low with about two thirds of the staff working with the CRD for three or more years; roughly a third have worked with a CRD for two years or less.

**Training:** Staff in the CRDs has received short-term training in various aspects of social work with children and families.

**Funding:** Each local CRD operates under, and is funded by, the local Hukumat. The salaries of the core staff of the CRDs are paid by the local government (Hukumat). UNICEF provides supplements for some of the staff and covers the salary of specialized staff such as a lawyer, data person or a social worker, and provides other types of assistance such as computers and office supplies.

**Impact:** According to an evaluation of the deinstitutionalization process in Tajikistan, "The CRDs have had a significant impact on the numbers of children being referred to institutions and on the number of the requests for placements being made... The CRDs streamlined a cumbersome, inefficient and ineffective system of placing children in institutions... Overall the deinstitutionalisation process has been successful and has received support from the national level. In most cases children seem to have received appropriate and detailed assessments by the CRDs and social workers."

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<sup>27</sup> Legal Analysis of the Children Protection System in Tajikistan, September 2008, conducted by the Commission on Child Rights, Carolyn Hamilton, UNICEF consultant.

<sup>28</sup> Article 152.2 Family Code and Regulation 8 Regulations on Guardianship Authorities No 98 of 11<sup>th</sup> March 2000.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL, MEDICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL CONSULTATION CENTER (PMPCC)

**History:** The first Psychological, Medical and Pedagogical Consultation Centre was opened in 2006 to provide diagnosis, therapy and supports for children with physical and mental disabilities. Four such consultation centres now operate in the country. They replaced the local Medical Pedagogical Commissions. Each PMPCC operates out of a local policlinic. In Dushanbe for example, the PMPCC in the Firdavsi District is a subdivision of the City Consultative Section of Policlinic #12.

**Organizational Structure:** The methodological management of the PMPCC is overseen by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Republic of Tajikistan. Each PMPCC operates under and is funded by the local Hukumat (local council).

**Location:** There are currently four PMPCCs in the country. These are located at Dushanbe (Firdavsi District), Khujand, Isfara, and Kurghantube. Another PMPCC is being considered for Kanibadam.

**Program Model (Functions):** There is some variation in the activities and staffing of the PMPCCs but all provide diagnosis, therapy, gatekeeping and referral for children from birth to age 18 with physical and mental disabilities. They also provide legal advice and consultation to parents of children with disabilities. The PMPCCs also assess children who are living in special institutions for children with disabilities.<sup>29</sup>

**Assessment and Diagnosis:** Children who come to a PMPCC for the first time are assessed and a diagnosis is provided. In one PMPCC children are seen by six specialists: a hearing specialist, a neurologist, a logopaedist, a special educator, a psychologist and a "defectologist," but not by a physiotherapist.<sup>30</sup>

A diagnosis of disability by the PMPCC, depending on the disability level, will entitle a child to a disability allowance. For the PMPCC in the Firdavsi District in Dushanbe in the first nine months of 2008, for example, 128 children were recommended to receive the social benefit and 59 were recommended to file the documentation to receive the disability pension.

Examinations and assessments are also conducted in residential institutions for children with disabilities in connection with a change of a child's condition or his or her transfer from one type of institution to another.

**Correctional Classes:** Specialists of the PMPCC conduct correctional classes (therapy) for children with problems in their physical and mental development. Special training and education

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<sup>29</sup> In 2007 the staff of the PMPCC conducted 15 visit visits to residential institutions to examine children.

<sup>30</sup> Report to UNICEF Tajikistan following a visit 26/07/06- 02/08/06, Professor Sheila L Wirz, Technical Expert on Children with Disabilities.

is also provided to family members to improve the home management and integration of the child.

**Gatekeeping:** The PMPCCs have the authority to recommend that children with disabilities be placed in a residential institution. The PMPCCs are now working to reduce the number of children who are placed in residential institutions by identifying and providing alternative care. Many of the children who are examined and found to have disabilities are referred to a variety of day programs, kindergartens and family support programs so they can continue to live at home.

**Information and Referral:** The PMPCCs refer families of children with physical and mental disabilities to receive various financial benefits (allowance for children with disabilities), social supports (parent support groups and NGOs that assist children with disabilities and their parents), schools that provide integrated classes for children with and without disabilities (e.g. special kindergarten No. 151 in Dushanbe), and referrals to other community programs that assist children with disabilities and their families.

The PMPCCs work in close cooperation with an association of parents of children with disabilities. In the Firdavsi District, for example, a Parents' Association occupies a room in the PMPCC facility. The Parents Association provides peer support to other parents, as well as provides advice on the care and raising of children with physical and mental disabilities.

**Children in Need:** It is estimated that there are 84,000 children with moderate and severe disabilities in Tajikistan. There were 2,502 children in 23 institutions for children with disabilities. Approximately 2.97% of children with moderate and severe disabilities live in residential institutions. It appears therefore that approximately 97% of children with moderate and severe disabilities are living at home.<sup>31</sup>

**Children Served:** For the PMPCC in the Firdavsi District in Dushanbe in the first nine months of 2008, 1227 children with disabilities were assessed (83.6% in the PMPCC center; 16.4% who were living in residential institutions).

Children who were examined and evaluated at the Firdavsi PMPCC who had disabilities were referred to various day programs (including special kindergarten No. 151, an integrated group in mainstream kindergartens, day programs in a residential school for children with vision problems,

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<sup>31</sup> The estimate is in the Report to UNICEF Tajikistan following a visit 26/07/06- 02/08/06, by Professor Sheila L Wirz: Justification for the figure: Taking the UNDP figures national prevalence of moderate and severe disability of

- 3% -5% in a total population (approx 3% in a child population)
- That 47% of the population of Tajikistan is under 18 years (2.8million)
- Total population: 6,000,000
- Under 18 years pop:2,800,000 x 3% (UNDP above) = 84,000 children with moderate and severe disabilities in Tajikistan

She reports there are 2,502 children with disabilities in 23 residential institutions based on data table provided by Furkat Lutfulloev *"Data on Children in Institutions in the Republic of Tajikistan"* (undated)

- 2,502 divided by 84,000 is 2.97%

home based learning and a mainstream school or kindergarten). Other children were referred to residential institutions for children with disabilities or to an infant home for children.

Referral Sources: In the Firdavsi District, children were examined by the PMPCC who came from Dushanbe as well as from other Rayons and Districts of the Republic. 50% of the children came on the initiative of their parents, 28% were sent by doctors, and 22% were sent by workers of preschool institutions.

Staff: The staffing of PMPCCs vary but the one in the Firdavsi District in Dushanbe has 9 staff including 6 who specialize in various areas of disabilities, a social worker, a lawyer, and the director.

Training: The staff at the various PMPCCs has had some training in new approaches to working with children with mental and physical disabilities. This includes special training in educational, psychological and developmental skills for children.

Funding: Each PMPCC is supported by the local Hukumat. UNICEF provides financial incentives for the staff and additional assistance such as computers and supplies. The Soros Foundation provides support for the Parents Association at the Firdavsi Center.

#### JUVENILE JUSTICE ALTERNATIVE PROJECT (JJAP)

History: In 2004, supported by UNICEF and the Children's Legal Centre (UK), the National Commission on Child Rights (NCCR) established the first Juvenile Justice Alternative Project (JJAP) in the Sino District of Dushanbe to provide a rehabilitation service that reduces offending and re-offending among juveniles. The JJAPs bring State and NGO organizations together to tackle juvenile crime. They rehabilitate children within their own communities rather than in detention centres and specialized institutions. JJAPs now operate in five locations throughout the country.

Legal Authority: Amendments in 2004 to the Criminal Code (Articles 89-92), which provided that where a child is found guilty of a non serious offence by the Court, deprivation of liberty should not be imposed. JJAPs are to be used as an alternative service.

Location: The first Juvenile Justice Alternative Project was set up in the Sino District of Dushanbe. The district was selected because it had high levels of poverty and the highest rate of juvenile offenses in the capital. Currently there are Juvenile Justice Alternative Projects in five locations:

- Dushanbe: Sino District, Firdavsi District
- Sughd Region: Khujand: Helping Hand; B.Gafurov (in the Child Rights Department); Isfara (in the Child Rights Department)

Organizational Structure: The Juvenile Justice Alternative Project in the Sino District is administered by the NGO Nasli Navras. It is part of the Children and Youth Centre which is supported by the local Hukumat (local council).

Funding: The JJAPs receive some support from the local Hukumat (local council) with additional staff incentives and other supports from UNICEF. The JJAP in the Sino District is funded by the Sigrid Rausing Trust (UK), the Children's Legal Centre with funds from UNICEF and the Soros Foundation.

There is no contribution from the Republican government. The local Hukumat owns the building, does not charge rent and through 2008 paid for water and electricity.

Children Served: The children served in the Juvenile Justice Alternative Project are ages 10-18 years (boys and girls) who are residents of the Sino District. The children were involved in anti-social behavior, non serious offences, less severe crime, medium offences and administrative offenses (e.g. robbery, theft, criminal damage).

Children must admit their offense and consent to participate in the program so the child can take responsibility for his/her behavior.

Other youth are also served in the Children and Youth Centre. They are approximately: Juvenile Justice (22%), children with disabilities (12%); child labor (25%), and other poor and vulnerable children (31%). The program serves approximately 250 children throughout the year and approximately 100 children on any day.

Referral Sources: The following entities can refer children involved in the juvenile justice system to the Alternative Centre:

- Court<sup>32</sup>
- Commission on Minors<sup>33</sup> (Child Rights Departments<sup>34</sup>) as an alternative to the special school and special vocational school
- Prosecutor's Office<sup>35</sup>
- Criminal Investigation Department<sup>36</sup> as an alternative to the criminal justice system
- Department for Fighting and Prevention of Crime Among Adolescents and Minors<sup>37</sup> as a prevention measure.

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<sup>32</sup> Referral process from the Court is carried out in accordance with the Criminal Code (Articles 89-92)

<sup>33</sup> The Commission on Minors has the authority to refer to children to the project under Regulation 18 (Regulations of the Commission on Minors)

<sup>34</sup> New local bodies which combine the functions of the Guardianship Authority and the Commission on Minors.

<sup>35</sup> Referral process from the Prosecutor's Office is carried out in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code (Article 5.2 and 5.5), Criminal Code of Tajikistan and other norms including the General Prosecutor's Order № 42 dated by October 10.10.2002.

<sup>36</sup> Referral process from the Criminal Investigation Department is carried out in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code (Article 5.2 and 5.5)

<sup>37</sup> The referral process from the Department is carried out in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code (Article 5.2 and 5.5) and the Minister of Interior's Order № 427 dated May 12 1996. The Department for fighting

Staff: The staffing at each JJAP varies. The Sino JJAP has an executive director, two workers trained in social work skills, a psychologist, a lawyer and a part-time physician.

Training: Staff at the JJAPs participated in training courses in social work with a focus on working with children in conflict with the law. Staff at some of the JJAPs receive ongoing training from an international social work specialist.

Program Model (Functions): The Sino JJAP provides a holistic service for the young person to prevent re-offending. It offers individually tailored programming of practical assistance and psychosocial support to each child to help him or her understand and change their offending behavior. Each child's program is developed following an assessment of the child's needs and the needs of his/her family.

Psychological assessment and support: Young people are assessed by the project psychologist on referral to the project. Where necessary, the young person is provided with one-to-one psychological assistance.

Family work: The project assesses and identifies specific problems and assists the young person and his/her family to address these issues and improve the relationship between the child and other members of his/her family. This work involves home visits and family group conferencing.

Legal support: The centre offers legal support for children as they go through the criminal justice process. Legal support is also available for the child and his/her family where they need assistance to access the services and welfare benefits to which they are entitled (such as health, social assistance and education) and to assist the juvenile to obtain documents, such as birth certificates and ID cards.

Remedial education/catch up classes: Illiteracy and poor attendance at school is common among juvenile offenders and children at risk of offending. The centre provides remedial education for participants, where appropriate. The project works closely with school teachers and school principals on the re-enrolment and support of children in school or to prevent the expulsion of children due to anti-social behavior.

Other Activities: The participants are offered other activities, such as vocational classes, healthy living, civic education classes, sport and excursions. These are provided to all local children who use the Child and Youth Centres. By basing the JJAPs in a Child and Youth Centre the diversity of activity is more than could be offered by the resources held within the JJAP team alone. Furthermore, the integration of the JJAP and the Youth Centres allow the youth to form relationships with other children at the centre.

There is also a focus on developing the children's leadership skills, with children provided with the opportunity to return to the centres once they have graduated from the JJAP as

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and prevention of crime among adolescents and minors is in the process of being reformed by the Ministry of Interior.

volunteers, to help with the activities and also to train other volunteers once they have graduated.

Follow up: The status of the children is monitored and recorded at the time of discharge from the program, at three months and at one year.

Outcomes: Since 2004 there have been 150 juveniles in conflict with the law who have been served in the Sino District JJAP. Four have recommitted crimes, one has returned to the commission for a decision. None of the other children have been reported to be in conflict with the law.

An evaluation of the JJAPs in 2008 concluded "The JJAPs have demonstrated to local and national government the benefits of providing community-based assistance to children in conflict with the law. [They are] a valuable and effective model for preventing offending and reoffending among children and young people that could and should be rolled out throughout Tajikistan..."

The Evaluation concluded that the JJAPs provide quality support and services to children and their families which impact positively not just on the child's offending behavior but also on their family situation and life chances."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> "Promoting children's rights in the juvenile justice system in the Republic of Tajikistan: Evaluation of the Juvenile Justice Alternatives Project," Commission on Child Rights under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, technically and financially assisted by UNICEF and the Children's Legal Centre, UK, October 2008.

## ANNEX 2. ASSUMPTIONS THAT UNDERLIE THE POLICY SCENARIOS

ASSUMPTION	S.Q.: CURRENT POLICY	MODERATE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION	HIGH DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION	LOW DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION
<b>REGARDING COSTS</b>				
Costs change at the average rate calculated from the rates of change of years 2006, 2007 and 2008	Salary costs, food costs and stationery costs fall under this assumption			
Costs change at one observed rate (when there is no data for three years, the rate of one year is used)	This assumption applies to costs for which no historic data is available (typically, this is the case of house appliances)			
Costs change following a cyclical pattern (this assumption relates to the type of costs, which don't increase continuously over time; the cyclical pattern assumed is the one observed over the previous years)	Maintenance costs, capital costs, costs of clothes and reparation costs fall under this assumption			
Costs take observed average value over time (in this case, costs take the same value every year, which is assumed as the average cost of the previous years)	This assumption applies to costs for which great variation was observed in historic data and no cyclical pattern was observed, such as communication expenses and 'other utilities'			
<b>REGARDING BENEFITS</b>				
The impact of suitable child protection policies is reflected as productivity gains	No productivity gains are observed	Productivity gains are observed (productivity gains are estimated in two ways: as the difference between the average labor income in the economic sector where the value is the highest and the average labor income in the economic sector the value is the lowest; as the difference between the average GDP in the sectors where this is highest and the sector where this is lowest).		
<b>OTHER</b>				
Average number of children de-institutionalized per institution closed	110, in the case of boarding schools; 250, in the case of institutions for disabled. Sanatoriums are not closed; the Special School and Special Vocational School (for children in conflict with the law) are unique.			
De-institutionalization level varies across scenarios	No further de-institutionalization takes place	Moderate de-institutionalization takes place (36 institutions are closed in the time horizon of the analysis)	High de-institutionalization takes place (49 institutions are closed in the time horizon of the analysis)	Low de-institutionalization takes place (14 institutions are closed in the time horizon of the analysis)
Guardianship allowance varies across scenarios	No allowance is provided	The monthly allowance starts at 60 TS/month and increases gradually over time analysis until it reaches 100 TS/month	The monthly allowance starts at 60 TS/month and increases gradually over time until it reaches 180 TS/month	The monthly allowance stays at the level of 60 TS/month during the time horizon of the analysis
Employment rate	96 per cent (source: ILO)			
High average labour income (TS per year)	Increases from 630 to 5000 over the period (based on ILO)			
Low average labour income (TS per year)	Increases from 75 to 600 over the period (based on ILO)			
Inflation rate (implicit in nominal rates)	13 per cent each year, during the whole period (based on IMF data)			
GDP growth rate (implicit in nominal rates)	7 per cent each year, during the whole period (based on IMF data)			
Implementation of JJAP varies across scenarios	No JJAPs are implemented	12 JJAPs are implemented	20 JJAPs are implemented	8 JJAPs are implemented
Implementation of PMPC varies across scenarios	No PMPCs are implemented	12 PMPCs are implemented	20 PMPCs are implemented	8 PMPCs are implemented
Implementation of CRDs varies across scenarios	No CRDs are implemented	33 CRDs are implemented	66 CRDs are implemented	20 CRDs are implemented

ANNEX 3. ILLUSTRATION OF COSTS OF A BOARDING SCHOOL (in SOMONI)

		2006	2007	2008
1	<b>Зарплата/Salary</b>	116181	167824	221805
2	Goods and services	44572	66785	50750
2.1	<b>Товары и Услуги/Goods and services</b>	35517	36500	40000
2.1.1	Снабжение товарами и услугами/Procurement of goods and services	600	1000	1000
2.1.2	Канцелярские товары/Stationary	5250	6000	6000
2.1.4	Предметы домашнего обихода/Household appliances	3000	4000	4000
2.1.6	Мягкий инвентарь и школьная форма/Soft furniture and uniforms	20000	20000	25000
2.1.7	Продукты питания/Food	4000	4000	4000
2.1.12	Представительные Расходы/Representation expenses	1000	1500	0
2.1.17	Прочее (товары и услуги)/Other (goods and services)	1667	0	0
2.2.1	Электричество/Electricity	2000	2000	2000
2.2.3	Отопление/Heating	1500	3400	3400
2.2.4	Уборка мусора/Garbage disposal	0	1000	1000
2.2.5	Вода/Water	2955	3000	3000
2.2.6	Прочие услуги/Other utilities	600	800	800
2.3	Ремонтные работы/Maintainance	2000	20000	0
2.3.1	Содержание здания и прилегающих построек/Building and premises	2000	20000	0
2.4	Средства коммуникации/Communication expenses	0	85	550
4.4.2	<b>Пенсия/Old age pension</b>	13315	10197	0
5	<b>Капитал/Capital</b>	25000	11000	10000
<b>Общие расходы/TOTAL COST</b>		199068	255806	282555

ANNEX 4 . COSTS OF THE PROGRAMS, INSTITUTIONS AND GUARDIANSHIP  
ALLOWANCE IN THE STATUS QUO AND THE THREE ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS  
(THOUSAND SOMONI)

YEAR	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>CURRENT POLICY (NO DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION)</b>										
BOARDING SCHOOLS	24,280	32,413	41,979	57,958	78,816	106,024	146,502	201,454	276,213	383,182
INSTIT. FOR DISABLED	9,099	11,390	15,821	17,739	22,677	30,824	38,446	53,761	86,341	170,724
GUARD. ALLOWANCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CRD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JJAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PMPC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER*	17,194	17,462	17,728	18,005	18,463	18,971	19,554	20,406	21,419	22,658
TOTAL	50,574	61,265	75,529	93,701	119,957	155,818	204,502	275,621	383,973	576,564
TOTAL AS %GDP	0.2903	0.2989	0.3070	0.3174	0.3386	0.3666	0.4009	0.4503	0.5227	0.6541

\*CASH COMPENSATION FOR THE POOR: SOCIAL PENSION AND CHILD ALLOWANCE

<b>POLICY ALTERNATIVE: MODERATE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
BOARDING SCHOOLS	24,155	30,145	36,494	47,107	59,889	75,311	97,286	125,058	160,287	207,864
INSTIT. FOR DISABLED	9,000	10,744	14,250	15,219	18,560	24,083	28,646	38,254	58,744	111,174
GUARD. ALLOWANCE	56	84	114	145	178	213	249	287	327	389
CRD	176	238	323	440	601	824	1,137	1,582	2,220	3,553
JJAP	351	432	536	668	837	1,055	1,336	1,699	2,168	3,029
PMPC	312	360	416	454	524	571	660	720	831	1,012
OTHER*	17,194	17,462	17,728	18,005	18,463	18,971	19,554	20,406	21,419	22,658
TOTAL	51,244	59,467	69,861	82,038	99,051	121,028	148,868	188,006	245,997	349,679
TOTAL AS %GDP	0.2942	0.2901	0.2840	0.2779	0.2796	0.2847	0.2918	0.3071	0.3349	0.3967

\*CASH COMPENSATION FOR THE POOR: SOCIAL PENSION AND CHILD ALLOWANCE

<b>POLICY ALTERNATIVE: HIGH DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION</b>										
BOARDING SCHOOLS	24,079	28,767	33,336	41,197	50,139	60,357	74,642	91,853	112,698	139,905
INSTIT. FOR DISABLED	8,954	10,452	13,562	14,153	16,878	21,423	24,915	32,551	48,934	90,697
GUARD. ALLOWANCE	70	118	173	235	306	385	475	576	690	914
CRD	176	255	371	541	792	1,165	1,724	2,570	3,866	7,105
JJAP	422	536	686	884	1,146	1,492	1,953	2,566	3,383	5,049
PMPC	390	463	551	618	735	825	980	1,101	1,307	1,687
OTHER*	17,194	17,462	17,728	18,005	18,463	18,971	19,554	20,406	21,419	22,658
TOTAL	51,284	58,054	66,407	75,634	88,459	104,619	124,242	151,622	192,298	268,015

TOTAL AS %GDP	0.2944	0.2832	0.2699	0.2562	0.2497	0.2461	0.2436	0.2477	0.2618	0.3041
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\*CASH COMPENSATION FOR THE POOR; SOCIAL PENSION AND CHILD ALLOWANCE

POLICY ALTERNATIVE: LOW DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION										
BOARDING SCHOOLS	24,246	31,796	40,451	54,864	73,292	96,850	131,463	177,581	239,177	325,938
INSTIT. FOR DISABLED	9,038	10,990	14,840	16,150	20,059	26,501	32,108	43,650	68,206	131,297
GUARD. ALLOWANCE	176	226	292	378	492	642	842	1,114	1,487	2,153
CRD	176	226	292	378	492	642	842	1,114	1,487	2,153
JJAP	351	415	494	591	712	862	1,048	1,279	1,567	2,019
PMPC	312	346	384	402	445	467	517	542	601	675
OTHER*	17,194	17,462	17,728	18,005	18,463	18,971	19,554	20,406	21,419	22,658
TOTAL	51,493	61,461	74,481	90,768	113,954	144,933	186,375	245,686	333,945	486,894
TOTAL AS %GDP	0.2956	0.2998	0.3028	0.3075	0.3217	0.3409	0.3654	0.4014	0.4546	0.5524

\*CASH COMPENSATION FOR THE POOR; SOCIAL PENSION AND CHILD ALLOWANCE

ANNEX 5. SUMMARY OF SITES VISITED AND DATA COLLECTED

Actor/Institution	Place	Type of data
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection	Republican Government, Dushanbe	Administrative data and Legal framework
Ministry of Health	Republican Government, Dushanbe	Administrative data
Ministry of Education	Republican Government Dushanbe	Administrative data
Ministry of Finance	Republican Government Dushanbe	Administrative data and Legal framework
Ministry of Justice	Republican Government Dushanbe	Legal framework
Ministry of Interior	Republican Government Dushanbe	Legal framework
National Commission on Child Rights	President's Office, Dushanbe	Legal framework
Parents Education Centre (PEC) and Kinder garden 151	Local Government (former UNICEF's Pilot Project), Dushanbe	Administrative data
Psychological Medical Pedagogical Consultation (PMPC)	UNICEF's Pilot Project, Dushanbe	Administrative data
Child Rights Department	UNICEF's Pilot Project, Dushanbe	Administrative data
Actor/Institution	Place	Type of data
Finance Department	Local Government, Hukumat, Isfara	Administrative data
Social Protection Services Department	Local Government, Hukumat, Isfara	Administrative data
Education Department	Local Government, Hukumat, Isfara	Administrative data
Boarding School	Local Boarding School for blind children, Isfara	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)
Boarding School	Local Boarding School for orphans and poor children, Isfara	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)
Boarding School	Local Boarding School for orphans and poor children, Isfara	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)
Boarding School	Local Boarding School for orphans and poor children, Isfara	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)

Diversion Project	UNICEF's Pilot Project, Isfara	Administrative data
Child Rights Department	UNICEF's Pilot Project, Isfara	Administrative data
Interviews held with children and their parents	Different households in Isfara	Qualitative data: individual experiences
Interviews held with fully orphan children	Boarding School for orphans and poor, Isfara	Qualitative data: individual experiences
Interviews held with children and their instructors	Boarding School for Blind, Isfara	Qualitative data: individual experiences
Focus groups with children	Boarding School, girls section, Isfara	Qualitative data: individual experiences
Focus groups with children	Boarding School, boys section, Isfara	Qualitative data: individual experiences
<b>Actor/Institution</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Type of data</b>
Finance Department	Local Government, Hukumat, Rudaki	Administrative data
Social Services Department	Local Government, Hukumat, Rudaki	Administrative data
Education Department	Local Government, Hukumat, Rudaki	Administrative data
Sanatorium Boarding School	Local Boarding School for children with weak health, Rudaki	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)
Boarding School	Republican School for deaf children, Rudaki	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)
Boarding School	Republican School for half deaf children, Rudaki	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)
Boarding School	Local Boarding School for orphans and poor children, Rudaki	Administrative data (flow of children, income, expenditure and self-production)
<b>Actor/Institution</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Type of data</b>
Child Rights Department	UNICEF's Pilot Project, Jomi	Administrative data
Child Rights Department	UNICEF's Pilot Project, Bokhtar	Administrative data
<b>Actor/Institution</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Type of data</b>
UK Children's Legal Centre	NGO, Dushanbe	Contextual information
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)	NGO, Dushanbe	Contextual information
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)	NGO, Dushanbe	Contextual information

Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA)	NGO, Dushanbe	Contextual information
Team responsible of the Vertical Review	Consultancy, Dushanbe	Contextual information
International Labour Organization	International Agency, Dushanbe	Contextual information
World Bank	International Agency, Dushanbe	Contextual information
International Migration Office	International Agency, Dushanbe	Contextual information
European Commission	International Agency, Dushanbe	Contextual information
UNICEF	UNICEF, Dushanbe	Contextual information
UNICEF	UNICEF, Dushanbe	Administrative data and contextual information